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Comment 
 
If You Don’t Have Anything Nice to 
Say, Say It Anyway:  Libel Tourism 
and the SPEECH Act 
Nicole M. Manzo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following:1 
 The National Affair publishes an article about Kim 
Kardashian and Kanye West.  The article is titled: 
“Multi-Million Dollar Divorce: Late Night Lies, 
Intoxicated Fights; Kanye Files for Divorce & Custody—
What Will Happen to Baby North?!”  The magazine is 
predominately circulated throughout the United States, 
but is nonetheless accessible online from anywhere in the 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2015; 
B.S., Roger Williams University, 2012.  I would like to thank Professor Tanya 
Monestier for her invaluable assistance throughout the various stages of this 
Comment.  Thank you as well to Meghan Kruger and the 2014–15 Roger 
Williams University Law Review.  I would also like to express my 
appreciation and gratitude to my parents, Gladys and Anthony, my sister, 
Amy, and the rest of my family.  Finally, thank you to Peter Matteo for all 
your love, support, and patience. 
 1. The following hypotheticals are entirely fictional and used solely to 
illustrate two different scenarios involving transnational defamation and 
international forum selection.  
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world.  Over 500,000 issues of the magazine have been 
purchased in the United States.  In addition, the article 
has received well over one million hits on the National 
Enquirer’s website from IP addresses located within the 
United States.  No issues have been purchased in the 
United Kingdom; however, approximately 3,000 Internet 
users have accessed the online article from within the 
country.  Kardashian is infuriated by the false allegations 
surrounding her relationships with her husband and 
daughter; she files a defamation lawsuit in the United 
Kingdom.  Kardashian has traveled to the United 
Kingdom for photo shoots and interviews.  In addition, 
the pop culture icon spent an entire summer relaxing in 
London a few years ago. 
 HerezPilton.com, a celebrity gossip blog, posts an 
article on its website about the current behavior of well-
known Canadian pop star, Justin Bieber.  The article is 
titled: “Not So Baby Bieber at It Again: 2,518 Miles of 
Reckless Behavior from Toronto to Los Angeles.”  The 
entertainment blog is accessible online from anywhere in 
the world.  The article has been accessed from 
approximately 300,000 IP addresses in the United States 
and 525,000 IP addresses in Canada.  The blog post 
enrages Bieber; he claims that the allegations are false 
and that he has finally “straightened out.”  He files a 
defamation lawsuit in Canada.  Bieber is a Canadian 
citizen and frequently visits his native country for tours 
and family affairs.  His father remains a resident of 
Canada, and Bieber’s Canadian fans have remained 
supportive throughout his career. 
 Both of the above situations result in damages awards 
for the plaintiffs in each of their respective courts.  
Additionally, both plaintiffs retreat to the United States 
to enforce their judgments against their individual 
defendants.  The National Affair is a United States 
corporation and has no assets in the United Kingdom.  
Likewise, HerezPilton.com is operated solely from the 
United States; it has no assets in Canada.  Without 
enforcement in the United States, both judgments are 
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essentially scrap paper. 
 
Which judgment is a United States court more likely to recognize 
and enforce?2 The answer is—neither. 
 
The Kardashian lawsuit is an example of libel tourism:  a 
form of international forum shopping where a globally recognized 
plaintiff files suit in an “illegitimate forum” to take advantage of 
plaintiff-friendly defamation law.3  In contrast, the Bieber lawsuit 
is an example of international forum selection.  While both suits 
involve transnational defamation and choice of forum, Bieber, as 
opposed to Kardashian, filed suit in a “legitimate forum.”4  
 
 2.  Although recognition and enforcement are often used 
interchangeably, the terms refer to different processes.  See LAURA E. LITTLE, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 827 (2013) (“Judgment recognition pertains to a court’s 
decision whether to give a judgment legal force and effect in a subsequent 
proceeding.  This differs from judgment enforcement, which concerns the 
process by which a court transforms a judgment that it recognizes as valid 
into an actual remedy.”).  Herein, “enforcement” is used to refer to both 
recognition and enforcement.  
 3.  See Marissa Gerny, Note, The SPEECH Act Defends the First 
Amendment: A Visible and Targeted Response to Libel Tourism, 36 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 409, 410 (2012) (“Libel tourism is the term given to the practice 
of obstructing the First Amendment by suing American authors and 
publishers for defamation in foreign courts where a lower legal standard 
allows for easier recovery.”); Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Note, Libel Tourism 
Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 252, 254 (2009) (“. . . a recent explosion of forum-shopping, aptly 
called ‘libel tourism.’  Instead of suing American members of the media in the 
United States, wealthy litigants increasingly file suit in claimant-friendly 
countries, where the publication and the parties have little connection and 
the plaintiff is more likely to win.”); Tara Sturtevant, Comment, Can The 
United States Talk the Talk & Walk the Walk when It Comes to Libel 
Tourism: How the Freedom to Sue Abroad Can Kill the Freedom of Speech at 
Home, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 269, 269 (2010) (“This legal loophole of ‘libel 
tourism’ refers to ‘obtaining libel judgments in foreign countries where libel 
laws do not have the free speech protections’ as this country affords, and 
subsequently trying to enforce such judgments here in the United States.” 
(quoting Paul H. Aloe, Unraveling Libel Terrorism, N.Y. L.J., June 18, 2008, 
at 1, 4)). 
 4.  The terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” are used to better 
exemplify the different types of forum selection.  Although commonly 
referenced, there is no concrete dividing line.  See Note, Forum Shopping 
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1683–84 (1990) (“[T]he policy against 
forum shopping is not a principled distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate actions, but rather a discretionary tool by which a court may 
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Legitimate forum selection is a plaintiff’s choice between multiple 
available and appropriate forums, whereas the pejorative phrase, 
forum shopping, is more commonly associated with the selection of 
an illegitimate forum to gain a windfall.5  A legitimate forum not 
only has jurisdiction over the cause of action, but would also be 
regarded as an appropriate selection because of the close 
connection between the forum and cause of action.  An action in 
this forum is one that is not appropriately dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds.6  In comparison, an illegitimate forum has 
jurisdiction over the cause of action under its own rules of 
jurisdiction, but nevertheless, is one that an American court 
would not regard as an appropriate forum for resolving the 
dispute.  In other words, the forum is a product of forum shopping 
and a prime candidate for a forum non conveniens dismissal. 
A Harvard Law Review note summarized the distinction as 
follows:  “A court will call a practice ‘forum shopping’ when it 
wishes to paint it as an unsavory machination designed to thwart 
public policy and achieve an unmerited goal.  By contrast, it will 
avoid the label when it considers the reasons behind the forum 
selection reasonable or justified.”7  Many other commentators 
have recognized the relationship between forum selection, forum 
 
constrain actions or motives it finds distasteful.”). 
 5.  See generally Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A 
Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999); Debra Lyn 
Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2006); Nita Ghei & Francesco 
Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts 
Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367 (2004); Richard Maloy, 
Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25 (2005); 
Markus Petsche, What’s Wrong with Forum Shopping? An Attempt to Identify 
and Assess the Real Issues of a Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L LAW. 1005 
(2011); Emil Petrossian, Note, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational 
Forum Shopping in the United States and England, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257 
(2007); Note, supra note 4.  
 6.  Forum non conveniens literally means “unsuitable court.”  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (10th ed. 2014) (“The doctrine that an 
appropriate forum—even though competent under the law—may divest itself 
of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it 
appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action 
might also have been properly brought in the first place. . . . Forum non 
conveniens allows a court to exercise its discretion to avoid the oppression or 
vexation that might result from automatically honoring plaintiff’s forum 
choice.” (quoting JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.17, at 87–
88 (2d ed. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 7.  Note, supra note 4, at 1683. 
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shopping, and the legitimacy of the forum.8  For instance, 
Professor Bassett noted that “[t]he semantic distinction between 
forum ‘selection’ and forum ‘shopping’ suggests a legitimate choice 
versus an illegitimate one.”9 
The Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established 
Constitutional Heritage Act (“SPEECH Act”) is federal legislation 
that aims to deter libel tourism and ensure First Amendment 
protection for potential defamation defendants in the United 
States.10  Under the Act, a foreign defamation judgment is 
presumed unenforceable in the United States.11  The presumption 
is rebuttable if the party seeking to enforce the judgment can 
prove that either: (a) the foreign law offers as much speech 
protection as the First Amendment and the constitution of the 
enforcing court;12 or (b) the plaintiff would have been successful 
had the case originally been litigated in the enforcing court.13  
Essentially, the judgment will be enforced “only if the plaintiff 
would have been able to assert a successful claim for defamation 
under the substantive defamation law of the state in which the 
domestic court is located.”14 
Neither judgment in the hypotheticals above would likely be 
enforceable in the United States under the SPEECH Act.  First, 
the defamation law in both the United Kingdom and Canada is 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 5, at 342; Ghei & Parisi, supra note 5, 
at 1390–92. 
 9.  Bassett, supra note 5, at 342.  Professor Bassett continued by noting 
that the “distinction is impossible to maintain with any consistency.”  Id.  
 10.  28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105 (2012).  See also generally S. REP. NO. 111-
224 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-154 (2009).   
 11.  See id. § 4102.  Other commentators have advised attacking the 
issue of libel tourism from other conflict of laws viewpoints.  See David A. 
Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 77–88 (2012) (choice of 
law); Darren J. Robinson, Note, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 
Libel Tourism, and the SPEECH Act: Protecting Speech or Discouraging 
Foreign Legal Cooperation?, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 911, 928–
30  (2013) (jurisdiction). 
 12.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A). 
 13.  Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B). 
 14.  Mark D. Rosen, The SPEECH Act’s Unfortunate Parochialism: Of 
Libel Tourism and Legitimate Pluralism, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 99, 105 (2012) 
(emphasis added).  In more mathematical terms, either A (foreign court law) 
= B (domestic court law), or A ≠ B, but plaintiff would have been successful 
under the laws of B regardless.  Either way, the law of B determines the 
outcome of the enforcement proceeding.   
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contrary to that of the United States.15  Second, it is unlikely that 
either plaintiff would have been successful on domestic soil.  To 
explain, it would be difficult to prove that either article was 
published with malice or that the opinions were supported by 
facts—two common requirements under United States defamation 
law.16  Therefore, despite one’s intuitive response that Bieber’s 
judgment would have a greater chance at enforcement, the Act 
will treat both judgments the same.  Neither judgment would be 
entitled to enforcement in the United States.  Notwithstanding 
the legislative intent behind the statute—to curb libel tourism and 
protect the First Amendment—the Act fails to differentiate 
between legitimate forum selection and illegitimate forum 
shopping in its enforcement (or more accurately, non-enforcement) 
of foreign defamation judgments.17 
This Comment argues that the SPEECH Act is overly broad 
in its application, and as a result, risks offending international 
comity.  In Part II, I provide a brief introduction to libel tourism 
by explaining the substantive and procedural differences in the 
laws of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada.  I also 
discuss libel tourism’s tendency to chill free speech under the First 
Amendment.  In Part III, I outline various sections of the 
SPEECH Act and analyze the Act’s application.  I use the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. 
Handshoe18 to exemplify the broad application of the SPEECH Act 
in Part IV.  I argue that the Act fails to differentiate between 
legitimate forum selection and illegitimate forum shopping.  
Moreover, I assert that the Act affords too little protection to 
foreign defamation plaintiffs.  I argue that the exceptions to non-
enforcement are illusory and fail to provide courts with 
appropriate guidance.  More pointedly, the Act does not explicitly 
state how speech protection should be applied in a given case.  I 
 
 15.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 16.  See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1990) 
(opinion); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (malice). 
 17.  See Rosen, supra note 14, at 103–04 (“The Act makes no effort to 
distinguish between libel tourism—the suing in a foreign jurisdiction to 
wrongfully gain access to that country’s pro-plaintiff law—and a defamation 
claim that does not constitute libel tourism (for instance, a claim litigated in 
a foreign country, under that country’s defamation law, because everything 
relevant to the defamation occurred there).”).  
 18.  729 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2013).  
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conclude that the SPEECH Act jeopardizes international comity.  
In Part V, I suggest that forum non conveniens should be used as 
a threshold to the Act’s applicability.  I believe that this threshold 
will help courts differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate 
forums, as well as better effectuate the legislative intent behind 
the Act.  I also suggest a statutory revision of the Act to provide 
courts with a structured framework and ensure consistency in 
foreign defamation enforcement proceedings.  In Part VI, I offer 
some closing remarks. 
II. LIBEL TOURISM & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The initial question asked by almost every plaintiff is: where 
should I file suit?  But what appears to be a very straightforward 
question actually encompasses a variety of auxiliary questions.  
What forums have personal jurisdiction over the defendant?  
Which choice of law rules are used in that particular forum?  Is 
the applicable law most beneficial to the plaintiff or the 
defendant?  These types of questions converge to answer the 
macro-level question of where to file suit and enable the plaintiff 
to take advantage of the most plaintiff-friendly forum for the 
circumstances.  The strategic selection of a forum, however, is not 
often viewed as an honorable litigation tactic.19  Plaintiffs often 
select forums with little connection to the cause of action in order 
to gain a windfall and incentivize the defendant to settle out of 
court.  This form of strategic decision-making at the outset of 
litigation is better known as “forum shopping.”20 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Algero, supra note 5, at 80–81 (recognizing that most law 
school students are taught that “‘selecting’ a forum [is] a necessary practice 
for those filing a lawsuit; ‘shopping’ for one, on the other hand, [is] 
forbidden”); Bassett, supra note 5, at 337 (acknowledging that one news 
article described forum shopping as “the notorious practice by which personal 
injury attorneys cherry-pick courts and bring lawsuits in jurisdictions that 
consistently hand down astronomical awards, even when the case has little or 
no connection to the State or locality” (quoting Blunt Votes to Curb Libel 
Tourism, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 14, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
But see The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436 (H.L.) 471 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (“‘Forum-shopping’ is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of 
saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will naturally 
choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favorably presented: 
this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation.”). 
 20.  See supra note 5; see also generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum 
Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553 (1989) (describing 
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Libel tourism is a form of international forum shopping for 
defamation plaintiffs.21  These plaintiffs engage in strategic forum 
shopping in order to locate a jurisdiction that has plaintiff-friendly 
defamation law.22  In addition to the beneficial substantive law, 
defamation plaintiffs are able to consider forums that have little 
connection to the cause of action by taking advantage of liberal 
personal jurisdiction requirements in foreign countries.23  
Therefore, the concept of libel tourism as a form of forum shopping 
allows a plaintiff to benefit from both favorable substantive and 
procedural law.  Libel tourists are most often plaintiffs who are 
defamed predominantly in the United States, but who file suit in 
forums such as the United Kingdom or Canada.24  The aforesaid is 
due in large part to the differences in the countries’ laws on free 
speech, with the United States regarded as deifying free speech 
and the United Kingdom and Canada, for instance, as placing 
reasonable restrictions where necessary to safeguard reputation.25 
 
historic forum shopping). 
 21.  See supra note 3. 
 22.  Cf. Doug Rendleman, Collecting a Libel Tourist’s Defamation 
Judgment?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 468 (2010) (“[A] lawyer has a duty to 
his client to secure the most favorable result possible, which includes finding 
the most beneficial substantive law in the most hospitable forum.”).  
 23.  See Bruce D. Brown & Clarissa Pintado, The Small Steps of the 
SPEECH Act, VA. J. INT’L L. DIG., March 19, 2014, at 1, 2 (“What is more, 
contrary to the standards in the United States, English courts [are] willing to 
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant publisher who was not 
deliberately targeting a British audience.”); Gerny, supra note 3, at 410 
(“Libel plaintiffs typically seek out countries who[] . . . have a tenuous 
connection to the purportedly defamatory statements that prompted the 
suit.”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Libel Tourism: Hearing on H.R. 6146 Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
1 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Steven Cohen, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Commercial & Admin. Law) (referring to London as the “libel 
capital of the world”); Daniel C. Taylor, Note, Libel Tourism: Protecting 
Authors and Preserving Comity, 99 GEO. L.J. 189, 190–96 (2010) (discussing 
exorbitant exercises of personal jurisdiction in the United Kingdom, in suits 
concerning defamation that predominately occurred in the United States).  
See also Am. Soc’y Int’l L., U.S. Legislation Blocks Enforcement of “Libel 
Tourism” Judgments, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 681, 682 (John R. Cook ed., 2010) 
(“Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, and Singapore also have been cited as 
jurisdictions where harsh libel laws invite plaintiffs’ lawsuits against U.S. 
journalists, writers, and publishers.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Eugénie Brouillet, Free Speech, Reputation, and the 
Canadian Balance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 33, 52 (2005–06) (“In the Canadian 
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A. Substantive Differences in Defamation Law 
Substantively, defamation law in foreign countries differs 
significantly from that of the United States.26  In the famous case 
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme 
Court abandoned the common law, strict liability approach to 
defamation.27  In doing so, the Court held that a public official 
who is defamed on public matters has the burden to prove that the 
defamatory statements were false and made with malicious 
intent.28  Therefore, under United States defamation law, a purely 
public defamation plaintiff must prove that the statements were: 
(1) published, (2) directed towards the plaintiff, (3) capable of a 
defamatory meaning,29 (4) false, and (5) made with malice.30  The 
notion of a public official was expanded to include public figures in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.31  For those plaintiffs who are not 
considered “public,” but are, nonetheless, defamed in a public way, 
some form of fault is still required; however, the states are free to 
 
common law, the courts have chosen a low threshold for the establishment by 
the plaintiff of a prima facie cause of action in defamation, offering 
considerable protection to his right to reputation. . . . America laws . . . seem 
to show a certain bias towards freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press.”); Gerny, supra note 3, at 416 (“In the United States, freedom of 
expression is accorded the highest value, and injury to one’s reputation, 
although regrettable, is sometimes an inevitable consequence of preserving 
this freedom. Conversely, in other countries, particularly England, damage to 
one’s reputation may trump the value of free expression.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Stephen Bates, Libel Capital No More? Reforming British 
Defamation Law, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 233, 241–54 (2012); Gerny, 
supra note 3, at 416–19; Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 255–59. 
 27.  376 U.S. 254 (1964).  See also Elizabeth Samson, The Burden to 
Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and U.S. 
Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England’s Modern Day, 20 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 771, 777–81 (2012). 
 28.  N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees 
require[ ] . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he 
proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 
or not.”). 
 29.  A defamatory statement is defined as one that “tends . . . to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or 
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”  RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 559 (1938).  
 30.  See, e.g., 128 AM. JUR. TRIALS  §§ 2–11, 26–36 (2013). 
 31.  388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (“[A] ‘public figure’ who is not a public 
official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood.”).  
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impose the degree.32  The First Amendment adds the 
requirements of falsity and fault to enhance protection of free 
speech.33  In an area of law where proving truth or falsity is 
nearly impossible, the burdened party is not likely to be 
successful.  Therefore, the burden often becomes dispositive.34  
For example, how exactly is a plaintiff supposed to prove that he 
is not in the mafia?  Then again, how is a defendant supposed to 
prove that the plaintiff is in the mafia?  The placement of and 
difficulty in satisfying the burden of proof in a defamation suit 
render United States defamation law defendant-friendly and 
effectively place a protective shield around speech. 
In comparison, foreign countries such as the United Kingdom 
and Canada have defamation laws that differ considerably from 
those in the United States.  In both of these jurisdictions, 
defamatory statements are presumed to be false, and the burden 
is placed on the defendant to prove the truth of the statements.35  
Additionally, proof of fault is not required, as both jurisdictions 
retain a strict liability approach to defamation.36  Therefore, 
 
 32.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“[T]he 
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a 
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.”).  The United States Supreme Court has never decided if the 
element of falsity applies to private plaintiffs who are publicly defamed.  
However, the element is required by a majority of states.  See William G. 
Hagans, Who Does the First Amendment Protect?: Why the Plaintiff Should 
Bear the Burden of Proof in Any Defamation Action, 26 REV. LITIG. 613, 627 
& n.81 (2007).  In addition, the Court has never considered whether the 
traditional common law regime to defamation can be retained for a private-
figure plaintiff defamed on matters of private concern.  See discussion infra 
Part IV.D.  Nevertheless, these scenarios are not common to libel tourism 
because a private-figure plaintiff is not likely to have a global reputation and 
defamation of private concern is not likely to have a global reach.  
 33.  See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (explaining that the First 
Amendment encompasses “a profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, 
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials”). 
 34.  See Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 257 (“Proving truth can be 
an insurmountable burden, particularly when journalists rely on confidential 
sources.”).  
 35.  See, e.g., Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, paras. 28–33 
(Can.); Bates, supra note 26, at 246–47 (discussing truth as a defense to 
defamation in the United Kingdom). 
 36.  See, e.g., Grant, [2009] 3 S.C.R. at para. 28; Staveley-O’Carroll, 
supra note 3, at 257.  
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under United Kingdom and Canadian defamation laws, a 
defamation plaintiff must prove that the statements were: (1) 
published, (2) directed towards the plaintiff, and (3) capable of a 
defamatory meaning.37  Once again, the burden is dispositive.38  
Just as it was nearly impossible for the plaintiff to prove falsity, it 
is likewise nearly impossible for the defendant to prove truth.  
Foreign countries associated with libel tourism, such as the 
United Kingdom and Canada, have plaintiff-friendly defamation 
laws because the difficult burden is placed on the defendant.39 
For example, consider the following: Paolo and Daniela end 
their romantic relationship.  Daniela is devastated and writes the 
following on her well-followed blog: “Paolo is a mobster.”  Under 
United States defamation law, Defendant Daniela would likely 
prevail because Plaintiff Paolo would undoubtedly have difficulty 
proving that the statement is false.  Conversely, under United 
Kingdom and Canadian defamation laws, Plaintiff Paolo would 
likely prevail because Daniela would undoubtedly have difficultly 
proving that the statement is true.  Considering the secrecy 
surrounding mafia activity, both parties would have difficulty 
presenting evidence that Paolo is, or is not, in the mafia.  Thus, 
the success of a defamation suit for the same statement is often 
contingent on which party has the dispositive burden.  These 
substantive differences in international defamation law render the 
tort a perfect contender for forum shopping.40 
B. Procedural Differences in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction & 
Difficulty Obtaining a Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal 
Procedural differences in the laws of other countries pave the 
 
 37.  See, e.g., Grant, [2009] 3 S.C.R. at para. 28; Staveley-O’Carroll, 
supra note 3, at 257.  
 38.  See Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 275 (“[T]here is an extremely large 
burden on the defendant to unequivocally prove every detail of his statement, 
which in essence turns out to be almost impossible in the majority of cases.”).  
 39.  The requirements for proof of damages in a defamation action are 
also dissimilar.  In the United States, plaintiffs often have to prove actual 
damages; whereas, in many foreign countries, courts presume that damages 
have been suffered.  Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–
50 (1974), with Grant, [2009] 3 S.C.R. at para. 28.  
 40.  For additional differences in substantive law, see Staveley-O’Carroll, 
supra note 3, at 255–59 (detailing the differences between opinion and 
privilege in the United States and United Kingdom). 
MANZOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:22 PM 
2015] IF YOU DON’T HAVE ANYTHING NICE TO SAY 163 
way for the substantive benefits gained by libel tourists.41  A 
defendant’s best defense against an illegitimately selected forum 
is either: (a) a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or 
(b) a motion for forum non conveniens.  In a libel tourism setting, 
the former argument is sometimes problematic because of the 
liberal jurisdictional requirements in foreign countries.  For 
example, the United Kingdom will find personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant in a defamation proceeding if the defamatory 
statements cause real and substantial harm to the plaintiff’s 
reputation in the forum.42  In an effort to curb libel tourism, the 
United Kingdom recently adopted the Defamation Act of 2013 and 
tightened the jurisdictional requirements for defamation 
proceedings.43  The Defamation Act states that in an action 
against a person not domiciled in the United Kingdom or another 
European Union state: 
A court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine 
an action to which this section applies unless the court is 
satisfied that, of all the places in which the statement 
complained of has been published, England and Wales is 
clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring an 
action in respect of the statement.44 
The Defamation Act has not yet been clearly fleshed out by 
English courts; therefore, it is unclear how high of a jurisdictional 
threshold courts will impose in practice.45  Similarly, Canadian 
 
 41.  For additional differences in procedural law, see Gerny, supra note 3, 
at 423–25; Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 259–61 (detailing the 
differences in attorneys’ fees, statute of limitations, and publication rules).  
 42.  See generally, e.g., Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] UKHL 25 (appeal 
taken from Eng.).  The standard has been perceived as so loose that one 
commentator claimed, “in the Internet age the British laws can bite you, no 
matter where you live.”  Alan Rusbridger, A Chill on ‘The Guardian’, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, Jan. 15, 2009, at 57, 57.  
 43.  Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 9(2) (U.K.).  The Defamation Act also 
removes the presumption in favor of a jury trial, adds a defense of responsible 
“publication on matters of public interest,” provides additional protection for 
website hosts, and reforms the affirmative defenses of truth and honest 
opinion.  Id. §§ 2–5, 11.  
 44.  Id. § 9(2). 
 45.   After all, the new standard mimics the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, a tool that English courts do not afford much weight.  See infra 
notes 63–68 and accompanying text.  Cf. Tanya J. Monestier, A ‘Real and 
Substantial’ Mess:  The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 179 
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courts will assume jurisdiction over a defamation defendant if the 
action has a real and substantial connection with the forum.46  
The lenient jurisdictional test was recently reinforced in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Éditions Écosociété Inc. v. 
Banro Corp.47  There, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that a 
defamation action falls under the presumptive jurisdiction 
category, “the tort was committed in the province.”48  Despite 
acknowledging that a flexible jurisdiction test could subject a 
defamation defendant to suit in multiple jurisdictions, the Court 
stated that a tort is committed in the forum as soon as a 
defamatory publication occurs in the forum.49  The Court 
additionally stated that “publication may be inferred when the 
libelous material is contained in a book that is circulated in a 
library.”50  Therefore, the real and substantial connection test 
stated above is presumptively satisfied as long as the plaintiff 
sufficiently alleges publication in the forum.51 
Neither the United Kingdom nor Canada require that the 
defendant actually aim the defamatory statements at the forum in 
order to ground jurisdiction.  By contrast, under United States 
law, a court will have jurisdiction over a defamation defendant 
only if the defendant aimed the defamatory statements at the 
forum in order to cause “effects” there.52  In other words, a state 
will have jurisdiction over a defamation defendant only if the 
statements were directed with intent to defame the plaintiff’s 
reputation in that forum.  The stated test is commonly known as 
the “effects” test.53  This strict jurisdictional test is required by 
due process and the standards set forth by International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington and its progeny.54  The test ensures that the 
 
(2007).   
 46.  See, e.g., Éditions Écosociété Inc. v. Banro Corp., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 636, 
paras. 33–40 (Can.); Breeden v. Black, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666, para. 20 (Can.). 
 47.  [2012] 1 S.C.R. 636. 
 48.  Id. at para. 39; see also Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 
S.C.R. 572, para. 90 (Can.). 
 49.  Éditions Écosociété, [2012] 1 S.C.R. at para. 38. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  See id. at paras. 38–39. 
 52.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–91 (1984).  
 53.  See id. at 787 n.6. 
 54.  326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462 (1965); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
(1980). 
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defendant has sufficient minimum contacts in the forum.55  A 
defendant that directs his statements to cause harm to a plaintiff’s 
reputation in a given jurisdiction “purposely avails” himself of the 
privileges or benefits of that jurisdiction, such that “he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”56  Therefore, 
to ground personal jurisdiction, the United States requires a 
stronger connection to the forum than do the United Kingdom and 
Canada.  As a result, libel tourists enjoy the benefits of liberal 
jurisdiction standards, at least in relation to those that prevail in 
the United States. 
To be sure, the foreign substantive and procedural advantages 
are not available to all defamation plaintiffs.  Libel tourists must 
still have a reputation in the foreign forum that is capable of being 
defamed in order for the foreign court to be placed on the so-called 
“shopping list.”  Consequently, libel tourists are usually plaintiffs 
with a global reputation, such as celebrities, politicians, 
international entrepreneurs, etc.57  Plaintiffs with global 
reputations are able to argue that allegedly defamatory 
statements harm their reputations worldwide.  Modern technology 
only fortifies this argument because most publications are globally 
accessible on the Internet.  Accordingly, the Internet facilitates a 
plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate that his reputation was defamed 
in a variety of international jurisdictions.  In fact, the Internet has 
been cited as the largest facilitator of libel tourism.58  For 
example, one commentator noted that “due to the rise of 
technological advances and Internet accessibility worldwide, a 
 
 55.  See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 
at 297.  
 56.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 57.  See, e.g., Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007) 
(Khalid bin Mahfouz, a billionaire Saudi Arabian financier); Polanski v. 
Condé Nast Publ’ns, Ltd., [2005] UKHL 10 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Roman 
Polanski); Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329 (Eng.) (Don King); 
Richardson v. Schwarzenegger, [2004] EWHC (QB) 2422 (Eng.) (Arnold 
Schwarzenegger); Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 266 n.71 (Jennifer 
Lopez, Marc Anthony, Britney Spears, David Hasselhoff, and Cameron Diaz). 
 58.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 2 (2010) (“Given the . . . world-wide 
access to U.S.-based content over the Internet, concerns over foreign libel 
lawsuits confront many American authors, reporters, and publishers.”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 111-154, at 3 (2009) (“[C]oncerns have been raised that the Internet 
has rendered American authors and publishers especially vulnerable to libel 
suits in Britain.”). 
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published document has the potential to appear in any jurisdiction 
in the world.”59  She continued by stating that “[a]s a result, a 
libel plaintiff may have the option of initiating litigation in any 
jurisdiction they may chose, even though the publication occurred 
in the United States.”60  Furthermore, in 2008, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee acknowledged the “advent of 
the [I]nternet and the international distribution of foreign media” 
in connection with the Committee’s concern over the growth of 
libel tourism.61  Thus, due to the global accessibility of defamatory 
statements, a plaintiff with a reputation capable of being defamed 
in a foreign forum will often have a compelling argument that his 
reputation was actually defamed in the forum of his choosing 
(albeit, not always substantially). 
Defamation defendants likely will be unsuccessful in 
obtaining dismissal on a forum non conveniens motion as well.  
The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits dismissal of an 
action if there is another available, adequate, and more 
convenient forum to hear the case.62  Nevertheless, the doctrine is 
discretionary and not all countries recognize or apply it in the 
same manner.63  For example, a forum non conveniens dismissal 
 
 59.  Gerny, supra note 3, at 410. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  U.N. Human Rights Comm. on its 93rd Sess., Int’l Covenant on Civil 
& Political Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 25, July 7-25, 2008, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Report]. 
 62.  See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).  In a forum non conveniens 
analysis, the court considers both private and public interest factors to 
determine if the available and adequate forum is indeed more convenient.  
Such private interests include:  
 . . . relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive. 
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.  Public considerations include avoiding the 
“[a]dministrative difficulties [that] follow for courts when litigation is piled 
up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin,” as well as the 
“local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.”  Id. at 508–
09. 
 63.  See Gerny, supra note 3, at 425; Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 
264–65. 
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in the defamation context is rare in the United Kingdom.64  In 
Lewis v. King, the Court of Appeals restated the High Court’s 
comment that “[t]here would seem to be little point in addressing 
how much more convenient it would be, or would not be, for people 
to give evidence [in the United States] rather than [in Britain],” 
because the cause of action was not likely to be successful in the 
United States.65  Therefore, the court denied the forum non 
conveniens motion because the United States was not considered 
an adequate, alternative forum.66  In comparison, the United 
States Supreme Court has directly rejected this view of adequacy 
in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, stating that “if the possibility of an 
unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight 
in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be 
proper,” because plaintiffs often forum shop and choose a forum 
with “advantageous” choice of law rules.67  Therefore, a forum non 
conveniens motion will likely fail to insulate defamation 
defendants from being haled into court in a forum virtually 
unconnected to the cause of action.  With neither defensive 
motion—lack of personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens—
compelling, defendants victimized by libel tourists have few 
procedural escape hatches to utilize. 
C. The “Chilling Effect” on the First Amendment 
The substantive and procedural benefits offered by foreign 
countries render libel tourism a beneficial tool for those plaintiffs 
who can utilize it.  Plaintiffs are able to strategically choose a 
forum that will deliver a judgment they would likely not receive in 
the United States.  Nevertheless, libel tourism has major adverse 
consequences, mainly: a chilling effect on free speech, increased 
litigation costs, and unfavorable reputations for writers who have 
been victimized by libel tourists.  The most notorious case of libel 
 
 64.  See Gerny, supra note 3, at 425 (stating that the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens “does little to restrain the reach of English courts, because it 
is dependent on the discretion of the judge, and British judges view their 
jurisdiction broadly”). 
 65.  [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329, [18] (Eng.) (quoting King v. Lewis, [2004] 
EWHC (QB) 168, [37] (Eng.)). 
 66.  See id. at [45]. 
 67.  454 U.S. at 250. 
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tourism is Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld.68  Ehrenfeld, an American 
defendant, authored a book that detailed the funding of 
international terrorism.69  The book claimed that Saudi Arabian 
billionaire, Sheikh Khalid Bin Mahfouz, was a regular supporter 
of terrorism prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks.70  As a 
result, Bin Mahfouz filed a defamation suit against Ehrenfeld in 
the United Kingdom.71  The High Court of Justice in England 
found personal jurisdiction over Ehrenfeld based on: (1) a mere 
twenty-three copies found in the forum, which were purchased 
from Internet distributors, and (2) the first chapter of her book 
being globally accessible on ABCNews.com.72  Ehrenfeld chose not 
to defend the lawsuit in the foreign court, and a default judgment 
was entered against her.73  The court held Ehrenfeld liable for 
£30,000 in libel damages and £30,000 in attorneys’ fees.74  In 
addition, the court enjoined further publication of the book in the 
United Kingdom and mandated that Ehrenfeld publish an 
apology.75  Bin Mahfouz was unable to enforce the money 
judgment in the United Kingdom because Ehrenfeld did not have 
assets in the country.76  Surprisingly, Bin Mahfouz did not seek 
enforcement in New York, where Ehrenfeld did have assets.77 
Many scholars who have analyzed the famous case have 
observed that Bin Mahfouz is a “repeat libel-player.”78  
 
 68.  [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.); see also Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 
518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 
2007). 
 69.  Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 831–32.  The book at issue was RACHEL 
EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL: HOW TERRORISM IS FINANCED—AND HOW TO STOP 
IT (2003). 
 70.  Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 832.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  See id.   
 73.  Id. at 832–33.  
 74.  Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156, [74]–[75] (Eng.).  
According to 2014 currency rates, Bin Mahfouz and his sons were awarded 
approximately $76,000.00 (USD) in defamation damages and attorneys’ fees. 
 75.  Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 833. 
 76.  See Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 274.  
 77.  See id.  
 78.  Id. at 273; accord Gerny, supra note 3, at 412 (“frequent flier” 
(quoting Hearing, supra note 24, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, 
Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Bin 
Mahfouz has a section on his personal webpage devoted to his libel suits.  See 
UK libel actions, BIN MAHFOUZ INFO. http://www.binmahfouz.info/ 
faqs_5.html#uk_libel_actions (last visited Sep. 24, 2014).  It has been alleged 
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Presumably, a billionaire is indifferent to the receipt of £60,000.  
It is likely that Bin Mahfouz intended to silence Ehrenfeld and 
chill free speech, and many felt the judgment accomplished just 
that.79  Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment in the Southern 
District of New York stating that the foreign defamation judgment 
was unenforceable in the forum.80  On a certified question from 
the Second Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged 
that Ehrenfeld’s case was a prime example of libel tourism.81  The 
court, however, agreed with the federal district court: New York 
courts did not have personal jurisdiction over Bin Mahfouz.82  
Therefore, Ehrenfeld was unable to remove the “sword of 
Damocles” above her head.83  It has been acknowledged that this 
sword has “undermined [Ehrenfeld’s] reputation as a counter-
terrorism expert and threatened her credit history.”84  The 
Ehrenfeld case is a prime example of a transnational defamation 
plaintiff’s attempt to undermine the First Amendment. 
The risk of a foreign defamation suit undermines the free 
speech protection afforded to writers in the United States.  One 
commentator labeled libel tourism as a “legal loophole” to the 
First Amendment.85  In the same 2008 U.N. Report noted above, 
the committee reported that the global difference in defamation 
laws “served to discourage critical media reporting on matters of 
serious public interest, adversely affecting the ability of scholars 
and journalists to publish their work.”86  In essence, libel tourism 
 
that he has brought or threatened to bring at least 29 libel suits in the 
United Kingdom.  See Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 
2006 WL 1096816, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006), aff’d, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 
2008).  In addition, he has secured at least four-dozen “corrections” to books 
and articles.  See Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 268.  
 79.  See, e.g., Gerny, supra note 3, at 427 (“[Ehrenfeld] testified that she 
had many ‘sleepless nights’ worrying that Mahfouz would come to New York 
to enforce the English judgment against her.”); Sturtevant, supra note 3 at 
278 (“[S]peech was chilled . . . as Ehrenfeld’s United Kingdom publisher 
promptly ceased publication of her book in the United Kingdom based on the 
English judgment.”). 
 80.  Ehrenfeld, 2006 WL 1096816, at *2. 
 81.  Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007).  
 82.  Id. at 835–38. 
 83.  Hearing, supra note 24, at 14 (written statement by Rachel 
Ehrenfeld).  
 84.  Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 275.  
 85.  Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 269; accord Gerny, supra note 3, at 410.  
 86.  U.N. Human Rights Reports, supra note 61, ¶ 25. 
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places an enormous chilling effect on free speech in the United 
States.87  When publishing in the United States, writers need to 
take into consideration both the possibility of a domestic 
defamation suit as well as the possibility of a foreign defamation 
suit adjudicated under foreign law.88  Libel tourism displaces 
much of the protection afforded by the First Amendment because 
writers cannot publish with confidence that, so long as they 
comply with United States law, their publications will be shielded 
from scrutiny in a legal proceeding. 
The evidence of a chilling effect is troublesome to quantify 
because it is difficult to assess exactly what content American 
writers have withheld from writing and publishing.  Nevertheless, 
prominent media lawyers claim to have firsthand knowledge of 
the chilling effect that libel tourism has created.89  For instance, 
publishers have cancelled plans to release books in the United 
Kingdom—books that have already been cleared for publication in 
the United States—due to the risk of a defamation suit in the 
United Kingdom.90  In addition, media lawyers report frequently 
receiving letters threatening foreign defamation lawsuits from 
both United States and United Kingdom law firms.91  As a result, 
media lawyers “must . . . counsel their clients about the risks of 
their work being exposed [internationally] and the high 
probability of eventual litigation.”92  By specific example, in 2007, 
Cambridge University Press “responded with an all-out effort to 
preempt [a] libel suit” threatened by repeat libel-player, Bin 
Mahfouz.93  The publishers destroyed unsold copies, asked 
 
 87.  See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 2 (2010). 
 88.  See Gerny, supra note 3, at 426 (“Journalists are often compelled to 
self-censor their speech to ensure that their statements not only conform to 
the standards of the First Amendment, but also that they satisfy the more 
‘stifling strictures of English libel law.’” (quoting Hearing, supra note 24, at 
23 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, 
LLP))).  
 89.  See Hearing, supra note 24, at 23 (written statement by Bruce D. 
Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
 90.  See id. at 24 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker 
& Hostetler, LLP) (stating that a British publisher halted a book release due 
to threats from a Saudi Royal family). 
 91.  See id. at 56 (written statement by Laura R. Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP). 
 92.  Gerny, supra note 3, at 427. 
 93.  Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 268 (citing Cinnamon Stillwell, 
Libel Tourism: Where Terrorism and Censorship Meet, S.F.GATE (Aug. 29, 
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libraries around the world to remove the book, issued an apology, 
and paid Bin Mahfouz an unspecified amount of money.94 
Even if the judgment is not likely to be enforced by a domestic 
court, the mere cost of defending and litigating a lawsuit deters 
free speech. One writer explained that the Cambridge University 
Press’ actions detailed above were “based not so much on a lack of 
confidence in the book as on a fear of incurring costly legal 
expenses and getting involved in a lengthy trial.”95  Aside from a 
monetary burden, a defamation proceeding could also affect a 
writer’s reputation and future ability to publish.  For instance, 
after the Ehrenfeld case, Ehrenfeld noted that two different 
publishers, which had routinely accepted her work, declined to 
publish her manuscripts.96  She claimed that publishers are leery 
of authors who have been subjected to libel suits, and as a result, 
she has had to conceal portions of her research from her 
writings.97  Accordingly, the risk of a foreign defamation suit, even 
in respect to wholly domestic matters, undermines the free speech 
protection guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
III. NATIONAL RESPONSE TO PROTECT FREE SPEECH 
In an effort to curb libel tourism and the chilling effect on free 
speech, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of our 
Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (“SPEECH 
Act”) in 2010.98  The SPEECH Act is federal legislation that 
 
2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Libel-Tourism-Where-
Terrorism-and-Censorship-Meet-2544274.php). 
 94.  See Stillwell, supra note 93. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2006 WL 
1096816, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006). 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105 (2012).  The SPEECH Act was primarily 
motivated by the famous Ehrenfeld case and a string of state statutes that 
prohibited enforcement of foreign defamation judgments rendered under law 
repugnant to the First Amendment.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
1716(c)(9) (West Supp. 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(2)(h) (West Supp. 
2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(8) (McKinney Supp. 2014); see also CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 1717(c) (West Supp. 2014) (extending jurisdictional reach when 
seeking a declaratory judgment in the circumstances); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) 
(McKinney 2010) (same).  Prior to the SPEECH Act, enforcing courts were 
using the public policy exception to halt enforcement of defamation 
judgments rendered under law repugnant to the United States Constitution.  
See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).  See also UNIF. 
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applies with equal force to federal and state courts.99  In a 
nutshell, the SPEECH Act requires that United States courts 
presume foreign defamation judgments unenforceable.100  The Act 
is comprised of five major sections: “Definitions,” “Recognition of 
foreign defamation judgments,” “Removal,” “Declaratory 
judgments,” and “Attorneys’ fees.”101  The “Definitions” section 
classifies the types of defamation judgments that the Act aims to 
cover, as well as providing general definitions.102  Defamation is 
defined to include “any action or other proceeding for defamation, 
libel, slander, or similar claim alleging that forms of speech are 
false, have caused damage to reputation or emotional distress, 
have presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in 
 
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(3) (2005); 
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3) (1962).  
However, the use of this exception in the defamation context has been 
criticized.  See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 14, at 859 (“Had the court [in 
Telnikoff] engaged in an ordinary comity analysis rather than its misplaced 
constitutional frolic, it probably would have decided to enforce the foreign 
judgment.’); Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different 
Challenge for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an 
International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 644 (2000) 
(“As the dissenting judge [in Telnikoff] emphasized, it is hard to see how 
freedom of the press or any United States interest was implicated in the case, 
because there was no American interest in the parties or the transaction.”). 
 99.  28 U.S.C. § 4101(2). 
 100.  See id. § 4102. 
 101.  Id. §§ 4101–4105.  The Act also leads with congressional findings. Id. 
§ 4101, findings.  In short Congress found:  
[F]reedom of speech and the press is enshrined in the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to the Constitution . . . [S]ome persons are . . . chilling 
the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . by seeking out foreign jurisdictions that 
do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections to authors 
and publishers that are available in the United States, and suing a 
United States author or publishers in that foreign jurisdiction. . . . 
[Such] inhibit[s] other written speech that might otherwise have 
been written or published but for the fear of a foreign lawsuit. . . . 
Governments and courts of foreign countries scattered around the 
world have failed to curtail this practice. 
Id. (quoting Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established 
Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), Pub. L. 111-223, § 2(1)–(3), (5) 
124 Stat. 2380, 2380 (2010)).  Congress additionally mentioned the 
commonality of foreign libel judgments that are inconsistent with First 
Amendment protections, as well as the U.N.’s acknowledgement of the 
Internet’s adverse affects.  Id. (quoting SPEECH Act, § 2(4)–(5)).   
 102.  Id. § 4101.  
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criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”103  Therefore, 
the Act applies to all foreign defamation judgments, regardless of 
the subject matter.104  The section also states that the Act applies 
to both federal courts and state courts in “each of the several 
States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, 
territory, or possession of the United States.”105  The SPEECH Act 
is binding on all United States courts, in all states and territories. 
Section 4102, “Recognition of foreign defamation judgments,” 
outlines the scope for enforcement of foreign defamation 
judgments and is truly the heart of the Act.106  Most importantly, 
the section presumes foreign defamation judgments 
unenforceable.107  In essence, the section is structured so that a 
judgment will be enforced “only if the plaintiff would have been 
able to assert a successful claim for defamation under the 
substantive defamation law of the state in which the domestic 
 
 103.  Id. § 4101(1).  One commentator argued that the definition of 
defamation is too broad, and “the SPEECH Act could be applied to matters 
not typically considered defamation in the United States.”  Rosen, supra note 
14, at 104.  
 104.  See infra Part IV.D.  
 105.  28 U.S.C. § 4101(2), (5).  The section defines United States person to 
include:  
(A) a United States citizen;  
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United 
States;  
(C) an alien lawfully residing in the United States at the time that 
the speech that is the subject of the foreign defamation action was 
researched, prepared, or disseminated; or  
(D) a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or 
place of operation, in the United States. 
Id. § 4101(6).  The Act fails to limit its applicability to United States persons.  
The distinction is only mentioned in § 4104, Declaratory Judgments.  This 
shortcoming has been cited as a major flaw of the Act.  See Rosen, supra note 
14, at 102–03 (“[F]oreign corporations, foreign citizens, and other foreign 
entities would appear to be eligible to invoke its absolute defense against 
recognition and enforcement in [the United States].”). 
 106.  See 28 U.S.C. § 4102. 
 107.  See id.  Cf. Robinson, supra note 11, at 932 (“[T]hey can be certain 
that the United States will not cooperate when it comes to libel judgments.”); 
Eric Goldman, Big Victory In Effort To Curb Libel Tourism—Trout Point 
Lodge v. Handshoe (Forbes Corss-Post), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 
13, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/09/ big_victory_in.htm 
(“[T[he SPEECH Act means United States give effectively no deference to 
foreign defamation judgments.”). 
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court is located.”108  The section is primarily broken up into two 
main sub-sections: “First Amendment Considerations” (4102(a)) 
and “Jurisdictional Considerations” (4102(b)).109  In order for a 
foreign defamation judgment to actually be enforceable, both 
considerations must be satisfied.110  Both considerations, however, 
are stated in the negative, providing that a court “shall not 
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the 
domestic court determines that . . .”111  Therefore, although the 
statute does not contain the word “presumption,” the language 
unambiguously supports a presumption of unenforceability.112 
The First Amendment Considerations sub-section provides 
two different avenues (exceptions) for enforcement of a foreign 
defamation judgment.113  If a plaintiff satisfies either exception, 
the First Amendment Considerations sub-section is satisfied, and 
the litigant proceeds to the Jurisdictional Considerations.  The 
first exception, what I label the “Equivalency Exception,” allows 
for enforcement of a foreign defamation judgment if: 
[T]he defamation law applied in the foreign court’s 
adjudication provided at least as much protection for 
freedom of speech and press in that case as would be 
provided by the [F]irst [A]mendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and by the constitution and law of 
the State in which the domestic court is located.114 
Essentially, the Equivalency Exception allows for enforcement if 
 
 108.  Rosen, supra note 14, at 105 (emphasis added). 
 109.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)–(b).  For interactive computer service provider 
defendants, there is a third sub-section that essentially casts 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(2012) onto foreign defamation proceedings.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(c).  This 
particularized pocket is outside the scope of this Comment. 
 110.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)–(b).   
 111.  Id. § 4102(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 112.  As stated below, the burden of proof is placed on the party seeking 
enforcement.  Id. § 4102(a)(2). The fact that the burden is not placed on the 
party resisting enforcement further supports the presumption of 
unenforceability.  Compare with UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS 
RECOGNITION ACT § 4(d) (2005) (“A party resisting recognition of a foreign-
country judgment has the burden of establishing that a ground for 
nonrecognition . . . exists.”); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1716(d) (West 
Supp. 2014); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4803(d) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
1C-1853(f)–(h) (2011). 
 113.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A)–(B).  
 114.  Id. § 4102(a)(1)(A). 
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the foreign country’s speech protection is equivalent to the 
protection afforded by the law of the United States and the 
enforcing court.  The second exception, what I label the “Domestic 
Success Exception,” allows for the enforcement of a foreign 
defamation judgment if:  
[T]he party opposing recognition or enforcement of that 
foreign judgment would have been found liable for 
defamation by a domestic court applying the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and the constitution and law of the State in which the 
domestic court is located.115 
In sum, the Domestic Success Exception requires a suit-within-a-
suit and allows for enforcement if the enforcing court finds that 
the original defamation plaintiff would have been successful had 
the suit originally been filed in the enforcing court.  In other 
words, the enforcing court must find that the outcome of the case 
would have been the same under both domestic and foreign law.  
The exception also reinforces that the exceptions are mutually 
exclusive, and enforcement can occur through either avenue.116  
The burden of establishing the application of either exception is 
placed on “[t]he party seeking recognition or enforcement of the 
foreign judgment.”117  Consequently, the original defamation 
plaintiff has the burden to prove that the judgment should be 
enforced in the United States.  Nevertheless, even if an exception 
is satisfied, the party seeking to enforce the judgment must still 
satisfy the Jurisdictional Considerations.118 
The party seeking recognition of the foreign judgment—the 
original defamation plaintiff—must prove that “the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by the foreign court comported with the due 
process requirements that are imposed on domestic courts by the 
Constitution of the United States.”119  Accordingly, the foreign 
 
 115.  Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B). 
 116.  See id.  The Equivalency Exception focuses on the foreign forum, 
while the Domestic Success Exception focuses on the litigation at hand.  
Compare id. § 4102(a)(1)(A), with id. § 4102(a)(1)(B). 
 117.  Id. § 4102(a)(2). 
 118.  See id. § 4102(b).  
 119.  Id. § 4102(b)(1).  As with the First Amendment Considerations sub-
section, the burden of satisfying the jurisdictional inquiry is on the original 
defamtion plaintiff.  Id. § 4102(b)(2). 
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court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the original 
defamation defendant must satisfy the “effects” test stated 
above.120  In order to satisfy the Jurisdictional Considerations, a 
defendant must have directed the defamatory statements with 
intent to harm the plaintiff’s reputation in the foreign forum.121  
Therefore, viewing both the First Amendment and Jurisdiction 
Considerations in conjunction with one another, even if the foreign 
law is equivalent to United States law, and/or even if the foreign 
suit would have produced the same outcome if litigated 
domestically, the foreign defamation judgment still will not be 
enforceable if the defendant did not aim the defamatory 
statements in the foreign forum with intent to cause effects there. 
The remaining sections of the SPEECH Act offer additional 
protection to defamation defendants.122  First, the Act grants the 
defendant the ability to remove an enforcement action brought in 
state court to federal court.123  Removal is permissible if: (a) the 
parties are diverse, irrespective of the complete diversity rule; (b) 
the plaintiff is a foreign country or citizen and the defendant is a 
United States citizen; or (c) vice versa.124  In addition, the section 
waives the amount in controversy requirement.125  Second, section 
4104 outlines the specific requirements for a declaratory judgment 
and grants additional protection to United States defamation 
defendants.126  The cause of action is summarized as: 
Any United States person against whom a foreign 
judgment is entered on the basis of the content of any 
writing, utterance, or other speech by that person that 
has been published, may bring an action in district court, 
under section 2201(a), for a declaration that the foreign 
judgment is repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.  For the purposes of this paragraph, a 
judgment is repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the 
 
 120.  See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 121.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–91 (1984).  Likewise, section 
4102(d) makes clear that a party can resist enforcement of a foreign 
defamation judgment and/or contest jurisdiction regardless if the party 
submitted to the foreign court in order to defend the litigation. 
 122.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4103–4105.   
 123.  Id. § 4103. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. § 4104. 
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United States if it would not be enforceable under section 
4102(a), (b), or (c).127 
Therefore, the section specifically allows United States defamation 
defendants to file suit in the United States seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the foreign defamation judgment in unenforceable.  
Enforceability, in turn, is determined in accordance with the First 
Amendment and Jurisdictional Considerations detailed above.128  
However, in contrast to the burden outlined in the First 
Amendment and Jurisdictional Considerations subsections, the 
burden in a declaratory action is placed on the party resisting 
enforcement.129  Accordingly, a foreign defamation judgment is 
presumed unenforceable in a proceeding for recognition, and a 
foreign defamation judgment is presumed enforceable in a 
proceeding for non-recognition.  The section also provides for 
nationwide service of process by stating, “process may be served in 
the judicial district where the case is brought or any other judicial 
district of the United States where the defendant may be found, 
resides, has an agent, or transacts business.”130  Finally, section 
4105 of the Act outlines an award of attorneys’ fees, stating that 
“the domestic court shall, absent exceptional circumstances, allow 
the party opposing recognition or enforcement of the judgment a 
reasonable attorneys’ fee if such prevails in the action on a ground 
specified in section 4102(a), (b), or (c).”131  Thus, if the enforcing 
court finds the foreign judgment unenforceable, the court is 
required, absent exceptional circumstances, to grant the original 
defamation defendant reasonable attorneys’ fees.  The award is 
available only for a party resisting enforcement, i.e., the original 
defamation defendant.132  However, the grant of attorneys’ fees is 
applicable only in a proceeding for enforcement and not in a 
proceeding for a declaratory judgment.133 
As is evident, the SPEECH Act provides an array of 
 
 127.  Id. § 4104(a)(1).  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id. § 4104(a)(2).  The placement of this burden more closely mirrors 
the burden in other international judgment enforcement proceedings.  See 
supra note 112.  
 130.  28 U.S.C. § 4104(b). 
 131.  Id. § 4105. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
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protections to defamation defendants with assets in the United 
States.  The Act presumes that foreign defamation judgments are 
not enforceable in the United States and specifically allows broad 
opportunity for the defendant to seek a declaratory judgment to 
that effect.134  The Act is clearly aimed at deterring libel 
tourism.135  While laudable in purpose, the Act may have overshot 
the mark.  The main shortcoming of the Act is that it does not 
differentiate between judgments emanating from legitimate 
versus illegitimate forums.  The Act aims to deter libel tourism; 
yet, it also applies strict principles of non-enforcement to foreign 
defamation suits originating from legitimate forums.  The 
presumption of non-enforcement and the mandatory nature of the 
Act render the lack of differentiation between legitimate and 
illegitimate forums highly problematic. 
The SPEECH Act provides too little protection to foreign 
defamation plaintiffs.  The two exceptions allowing for 
enforcement are illusory.  First, the United States affords the 
highest free speech protection in the world.136  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that any foreign defamation law will be equivalent to, or 
provide as much protection as, that of the United States.  Second, 
the Domestic Success Exception provides little guidance on how 
an enforcing court should litigate a claim in the abstract.  For 
instance, it is unclear whether the success of the suit should be 
assessed on the merits (substantively) or on the pleadings 
(procedurally).  As a result, the Domestic Success Exception can 
also be viewed as illusory due to the statutory ambiguity and 
difficulty in obtaining equal results under different laws.  The Act 
also fails to explicitly state how speech protection should be 
applied in a given case.  The above renders the Act over-inclusive 
 
 134.  See id. §§ 4102, 4104.  Accord Gerny, supra note 3, at 434 (“The 
‘shield’ feature in the law permits an American defendant to remain passive, 
given that a foreign defamation judgment cannot be enforced in the United 
States unless the judgment holder meets the requirements of the SPEECH 
Act.  It also acts as a ‘sword,’ because it creates a cause of action for 
declaratory relief in federal court to challenge the enforceability of the foreign 
defamation judgment.”).  
 135.  See S. REP. NO. 111-224 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-154 (2009). 
 136.  See Rosen, supra note 14, at 106 (“[T]he United States provides more 
constitutional protection for speech than do other liberal democracies.”); 
Robinson, supra note 11, at 913 (“The United States has substantial free 
speech protections under the Constitution’s First Amendment that most 
countries do not have.”).  See also discussion Part IV.C.1.  
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and results in a high risk of offending international comity. 
Eventual non-enforcement is a possibility that is often 
considered by international plaintiffs when strategically deciding 
where to file suit.  However, given the complete opposite nature of 
United States defamation law as compared to many foreign 
countries, a transnationally defamed plaintiff choosing between 
two legitimate forums will often have to either: (a) risk non-
enforcement in the United States, or (b) file in the United States 
and risk losing on the merits.  Can this really be considered an 
option?  Is it fair that a plaintiff be penalized for choosing the 
latter of two legitimate forums?  The SPEECH Act’s various 
caveats were considered in the first and only case to interpret the 
Act:  Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe.137 
IV. TROUT POINT LODGE, LTD. V. HANDSHOE &                                                    
THE BROAD APPLICATION OF THE SPEECH ACT 
Although enacted in 2010, the SPEECH Act did not make its 
appearance in case law until September 2013 when the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. 
Handshoe.138  Considering the frequency of libel tourism, one 
might have assumed that the first case to apply the SPEECH Act 
would have been a testament to the benefits of, and the need for, 
the Act.  However, Trout Point Lodge was not an exemplar of libel 
tourism or illegitimate forum shopping.  The forum selected in 
Trout Point Lodge was not chosen to “chill” free speech.  Rather, 
the forum was selected because it was both plaintiffs’ domicile and 
the jurisdiction where the defamatory statements were aimed.  In 
addition, and most importantly, the forum was the location where 
the plaintiffs suffered harm to their reputations.  Trout Point 
Lodge was monumental, but not for First Amendment protection 
or the deterrence of libel tourism.139  The case was monumental 
 
 137.  729 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2013).  The court in Pontigon v. Lord, 340 
S.W.3d 315, 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), was unable to interpret the SPEECH 
Act because the record did not contain a certified and authenticated copy of 
the judgment.  In addition, the parties in Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar 
Group, Inc., Case No. 4:11cv9-RH/WS (N.D. Fla. filed June 20, 2011), entered 
into a stipulated judgment because of the near-conclusive nature of the 
SPEECH Act. 
 138.  729 F.3d 481.  See also Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 2012 
NSSC 245 (Can.). 
 139.  But see Goldman, supra note 107 (“This is the first appellate opinion 
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for exemplifying the broad reach of the Act and lack of guidance 
that Congress supplied the courts.  In essence, Trout Point Lodge 
is a paradigm model of the flaws of the SPEECH Act.  Despite the 
over-inclusive nature of the Act, one might have thought that 
Trout Point Lodge would exemplify the sort of foreign judgment 
that would “slip through the cracks” of the SPEECH Act.  
However, the judgment did not slip through the cracks; it did not 
even wedge itself in the opening.  Put differently, if there was one 
judgment that was capable of United States enforcement under 
the SPEECH Act, it was this judgment.  Nevertheless, the 
judgment in Trout Point Lodge did not even come close to 
enforcement. 
A. The Facts 
The defendant, Doug Handshoe, owns and operates a political 
blog from Mississippi called Slabbed.org.140  Handshoe is a United 
States citizen and is domiciled in Mississippi.141  His blog often 
discussed a Louisiana bribery scandal involving a man by the 
name of Aaron Broussard.142  Broussard owned property in Nova 
Scotia, Canada, which was located in close vicinity to Trout Point 
Lodge, a hotel and wilderness resort.143  Handshoe alleged that 
the owners of the lodge, Vaughn Perret and Charles Leary, were 
involved in the Louisiana bribery scandal.144  As a result, the 
Times-Picayune, a newspaper in New Orleans, claimed that 
Broussard owned an interest in Trout Point Lodge.145  Perret and 
Leary contacted the Times-Picayune and alerted the paper to the 
“factual errors in [its] reporting.”146  The newspaper redacted the 
 
applying the SPEECH Act, and it’s a big win in the battle against libel 
tourism.”). 
 140.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 483.   
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 483–84. 
 143.  Id. at 484.  See also TROUT POINT LODGE OF NOVA SCOTIA, 
http://www.troutpoint.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
 144.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 484.  Both Perret and Leary are 
American citizens, but have resided in Canada since 1998.  See Brief of 
Appellants at 5–6, Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d 481 (No. 13-60002), 2013 WL 
7089060.  Moreover, the pair has been without a United States residence 
since 2005.  
 145.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 484.  
 146.  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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earlier statements and issued a correction.147  In addition, the 
corporate parent of the newspaper removed Handshoe’s blog from 
the Internet.148  In response, Handshoe relaunched his blog on a 
different hosting website and “began an internet campaign to 
damage Perret and Leary.”149  In sum, the statements claimed 
that the lodge owners were connected to the Louisiana scandal, 
had misled investigations by Canadian officials, and engaged in 
fraud, which was leading to corporate bankruptcy, and 
homosexual conduct.150  Frustrated by the “derogatory, mean 
spirited, sexist, and homophobic” statements, the lodge owners 
brought a defamation suit against Handshoe in Nova Scotia.151 
The plaintiffs alleged that the statements by Handshoe were 
both false and made with malicious intent.152  However, the 
allegations were merely pled generally, as the burden is on the 
defendant to prove truth in a Canadian defamation proceeding.153  
Handshoe was served with process in Mississippi, but failed to 
appear in Nova Scotia.154  The Nova Scotia court entered a default 
judgment against Handshoe and conducted a brief hearing on 
damages.155  As a result, the court awarded $352,000 in monetary 
damages.156  The plaintiffs then filed suit in Mississippi state 
 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id.  It is not clear how the corporate parent of the Times-Picayune 
had any authority to remove Handshoe’s blog from the Internet.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. at 484–85, 493 (specifically summarizing the statements by 
stating, “Trout Point Lodge and its owners were somehow involved in 
corruption, fraud, money laundering, and ‘pay to play’ schemes . . . misled 
investors and court officials in litigation with the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency . . . Trout Point Lodge business is actively failing, near 
bankruptcy . . . [and] have had a series of failed businesses that used other 
people’s money . . . plaintiffs are either con artists or have no business 
acumen whatsoever . . . referred to Perret and Leary as girls, . . . queer f-g 
scum, and b-tches, published more than one reference to a gay-themed movie, 
and posted video clips of movies and music videos commonly associated with 
gay stereotypes.” (quoting Pl.’s First Am. Statement Cl.) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 151.  Id. at 484. 
 152.  Id. at 485. 
 153.  Id.; see also Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, paras. 29, 
32–33 (Can.). 
 154.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 485.   
 155.  Id.  At the damages hearing, the plaintiffs presented additional 
evidence regarding the alleged defamatory statements.  Id. 
 156.  Id.  Specifically, the Nova Scotia court awarded “Trout Point Lodge 
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court seeking to enforce their Canadian judgment in the United 
States.157  Handshoe removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and resisted 
enforcement of the judgment under the SPEECH Act.158  Both 
parties conceded that the issues were purely legal and submitted 
cross-motions for summary judgment.159  The district court 
granted Handshoe’s motion for summary judgment, and the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.160 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s ruling.161  The court held that the SPEECH Act blocked 
enforcement of the Canadian defamation judgment.162  First, the 
court compared Canadian defamation law to that in the United 
States.163  Not surprisingly, the court found that “Canadian 
defamation law is derivative of the defamation law of the United 
Kingdom, which has long been substantially less protective of free 
speech” than the United States.164  Therefore, the court easily 
disposed of the Equivalency Exception.  Second, the court assessed 
 
$75,000 in general damages, and Leary and Perret each $100,000 in general 
damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $25,000 in punitive damages.  
It also awarded $2,000 in costs.”  Id.  The Novia Scotia court also issued an 
injunction against Handshoe “restraining him from disseminating, posting on 
the Internet or publishing, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, 
any statements about the plaintiffs, Trout Point Lodge, Charles L. Leary, and 
[Vaughn] J. Perret.” Id. at 485 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Trout 
Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 2012 NSSC 245, para. 105 (Can.)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 157.  Id. at 486. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id.  This concession was arguably in error on the part of the 
plaintiffs.  By making this concession, the parties relinquished the 
opportunity to conduct discovery that never occurred in the Canadian suit.  
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 144, at 5; Brief of Appellee at 3, Trout 
Point Lodge, 729 F.3d 481 (No. 13-60002), 2013 WL 1332824.  Although the 
SPEECH Act is fairly straightforward, application of the Domestic Success 
Exception can hardly be deemed strictly legal in nature.  The exception calls 
for an inquiry into the success of the plaintiff’s claim on domestic soil.  See 28 
U.S.C.  § 4102(a)(1)(B) (2012).  Issues of defamation are not purely questions 
for the court.  Therefore, by forgoing discovery the plaintiffs’ greatly limited 
their opportunity to satisfy the second exception, considering that the 
Canadian proceeding did not include discovery either.   
 160.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 486.  
 161.  Id. at 496.  
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 488–90. 
 164.  Id. at 488. 
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whether the Canadian Statement of Claim (the equivalent of an 
American complaint) was sufficient to support a default judgment 
under Mississippi law.165  In other words, the court assessed the 
Domestic Success Exception on the pleadings.  The court found 
that in the Statement of Claim, falsity, which is an element of a 
plaintiff’s prima facie defamation claim in the United States but 
not in Canada, was insufficiently pled.166  Accordingly, the court 
found that the Statement of Claim was insufficient to support a 
default judgment in Mississippi.167  The court reviewed the 
Canadian damages proceeding and briefly assessed the Domestic 
Success Exception on the merits—that being whether the 
defamatory statements were actually found to be false.168  
However, the court found that the Canadian record did “not 
contain specific findings of fact with respect to the falsity of 
Handshoe’s statements.”169  As a result, the Court of Appeals 
failed to enforce the Canadian judgment under the Domestic 
Success Exception as well.170  The court consequently held the 
Canadian defamation judgment unenforceable in Mississippi.171 
 
B. Lack of Differentiation between “Legitimate” Forum Selection 
and “Illegitimate” Forum Shopping (Libel Tourism) 
As discussed, the SPEECH Act fails to differentiate between 
defamation judgments from legitimate forums and illegitimate 
forums; rather, it paints all foreign forums with one broad 
brush.172  This is despite the fact that, presumably, the Act was 
 
 165.  Id. at 491–94. 
 166.  Id. at 492–93.  The Court of Appeals also claimed that some of the 
statements alleged in the Statement of Claim were unverifiable opinions or 
legal conclusions.  Id. at 493–94. 
 167.  Id. at 494. 
 168.  Id. at 494–96. 
 169.  Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 170.  Id. at 496.  
 171.  Id.  The Court of Appeals did not analyze the Jurisdictional 
Considerations because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the First Amendment 
Considerations.  Id.  Given the prominent role jurisdiction considerations 
often play in the enforcement of international judgments, this Comment will 
not critique the considerations in the context of the SPEECH Act.  See UNIF. 
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 4(b)(2), 5 (2005); 
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5 (1962).  
 172.  See Andrew R. Klein, Some Thoughts on Libel Tourism, 38 PEPP. L. 
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enacted to deter only illegitimate forum shopping.173  Many 
commentators have acknowledged the over-inclusive nature of the 
SPEECH Act.  For example, one scholar questioned:  “[W]hat if an 
American is sued in England for passing out leaflets in Piccadilly 
Circus that allegedly defamed an English person? Can this United 
States person come to the United States and seek declaratory 
relief that the foreign judgment is unenforceable?”174  She quickly 
answered that “[t]he answer must be no.”175  However, the answer 
must be “yes,” for the Act fails to differentiate between legitimate 
and illegitimate forums.  There is absolutely nothing in the 
SPEECH Act that prohibits a United States citizen from seeking a 
declaratory judgment in these circumstances. 
Trout Point Lodge is a prime example of legitimate forum 
selection.  In Trout Point Lodge, the plaintiffs resided in Canada; 
the lodge was located in Canada; the statements were accessible 
by Canadian residents; and the statements mainly defamed the 
plaintiffs’ reputations in Canada, in the eyes of Canadian 
residents and foreigners visiting Nova Scotia.176  The plaintiffs 
summarized the legitimacy of the forum in their reply brief, by 
stating: 
Handshoe’s libelous publications concerned the Nova 
Scotia activities of Nova Scotia residents.  The 
 
REV. 375, 387 (2011) (“Professor Douglas Rendleman . . . argues that a broad-
brush rejection of all foreign defamation judgments ‘is both too blunt and too 
broad.’” (quoting Rendleman, supra note 22, at 487)).  
 173.   See S. REP. NO. 111-224 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-154 (2009). Cf. 
Gerny, supra note 3, at 436 (“One troubling feature of the SPEECH Act is 
that it does not define who specifically is a libel tourist.”). 
 174.  Gerny, supra note 3, at 437.  Another commentator noted: 
[I]t seems intuitively unfair for a U.S. court to issue an award 
against a foreign plaintiff who lives in London and sues over an 
American publication that was widely published in London, since its 
impact would be felt where the plaintiff lives and works and plans to 
work in the future.   
Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 291–92.  She went on to acknowledge 
that it would be easy to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate 
forums by noting that “libel tourists tend to stick out—on the streets and in 
the courts—so in most cases, judges will be able to distinguish the real cases 
of libel tourism based on the plaintiff’s and the disputed work’s minimal 
connections to the foreign forum.”  Id. at 292.  
 175.  Gerny, supra note 3, at 437.  
 176.  See Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 484; Reply Brief of Appellants at 
2–3, Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d 481 (No. 13-60002), 2013 WL 1752668.   
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publications impugned the Trout Point plaintiffs’ 
reputations and made allegations of moral turpitude 
against Perret and Leary, whose business and careers 
were and are centered in Nova Scotia.  Many publications 
were drawn from Nova Scotia or Canadian sources, and 
Trout Point, Perret and Leary suffered the brunt of the 
harm, in terms both of their emotional distress and the 
injury to their professional reputations.  Thus, Nova 
Scotia is the focal point both of Handshoe’s publications 
and of the harm suffered.177 
Unlike many libel tourism cases, the suit was not filed in 
jurisdiction X despite the reputational damage occurring in 
jurisdiction Y.  Here, the reputational damage occurred in 
jurisdiction X and the suit was filed in jurisdiction X—Nova 
Scotia.  Moreover, neither plaintiff had a global reputation.  Perret 
and Leary, the plaintiffs, are private individuals who own a 
private resort.178  Although they presumably have ties to both the 
United States and Canada, they are not in any sense “global” 
plaintiffs.  Nova Scotia was clearly a legitimate forum for the 
cause of action. 
In fact, it is questionable whether there was even another 
appropriate forum for the litigation.  The plaintiffs lived and 
operated a business in Nova Scotia since 1998 and relinquished 
residency in the United States in 2005.179  Therefore, it is 
uncertain if the plaintiffs’ reputations in the United States were 
even defamed at all.  Put differently, it is debatable whether the 
plaintiffs even maintained reputations in the United States that 
were capable of being defamed.  If the plaintiffs were not defamed 
 
 177.  Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 176, at 2.  Alternatively, 
Handshoe alleged in his brief that his statements were directed at a 
Mississippi audience because his blog was Mississippi focused.  See Brief for 
Appellee, supra note 159, at 13–14.  Yet, he posted this statement on his blog:  
I’ve just been informed . . .  
That the newest chapter of the Slabbed Nation has been formed in 
Nova Scotia and those good folks are wanting to see a conclusion of 
some kind of our earlier posts on Trout Point Lodge and its 
connections to the Jefferson Paris Political Corruption Scandal. How 
can I deny our newest fans such a request? Simple [sic] I can’t. 
Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 176, at 5 (emphasis in original). 
 178.  See Brief of Appellants, supra note 176, at 2. 
 179.  See id. at 6. 
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in the United States, the United States would clearly not be an 
appropriate forum for the defamation suit.  The United States 
would only be connected to the case because the statement was 
published by a Mississippi resident, from a Mississippi 
computer.180  Aside from the fact that the United States is an 
entirely inappropriate forum, it is uncertain whether any 
particular United States jurisdiction, aside from the defendant’s 
domicile,181 would have had personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  Given the strict nature of the “effects” test for 
defamation jurisdiction, it would likely be difficult to argue that 
the defendant aimed his defamatory statements to cause effects in 
any jurisdiction aside from Nova Scotia, Canada.182  Thus, Nova 
Scotia not only appears to be the most appropriate forum for the 
litigation, but may also be the only available forum. 
C. Too Little Protection for Foreign Defamation Plaintiffs 
To reiterate, the SPEECH Act provides two different 
exceptions to non-enforcement:  the Equivalency Exception and 
the Domestic Success Exception.183  The Equivalency Exception 
allows for enforcement of a foreign defamation judgment if the 
foreign country’s speech protection is equivalent to the protection 
afforded under the United States Constitution and the 
constitution of the enforcing court.184  The Domestic Success 
Exception allows for enforcement of a foreign defamation 
judgment if the enforcing court finds that the original defamation 
plaintiff would have been successful had the case been originally 
filed in the enforcing court.185  However, using the facts of Trout 
Point Lodge, I argue that neither exception affords protection to a 
 
 180.  See Brief of Appellee, supra note 159, at 13. 
 181.  A defendant’s domicile is a paradigm basis for general jurisdiction.  
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (citing Lea Brilmayer 
et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735 
(1988)).  See also Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot “At Home”?: 
Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS 
L.J. 233, 237 (2014) (“Notably, courts asserting general jurisdiction over a 
defendant can do so in the absence of any connection between the state and 
the underlying cause of action.”). 
 182.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–91 (1984).  See also notes 52–
56 and accompanying text. 
 183.  See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).  
 184.  Id. § 4102(a)(1)(A). 
 185.  Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B). 
MANZOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:22 PM 
2015] IF YOU DON’T HAVE ANYTHING NICE TO SAY 187 
foreign defamation plaintiff.  The lack of protection afforded by the 
SPEECH Act only magnifies the issue that the Act does not 
differentiate between judgments emanating from legitimately and 
illegitimately selected forums. 
1. Equivalency Exception 
The Equivalency Exception does not offer protection to foreign 
defamation plaintiffs because foreign speech protection will almost 
never rise to the level of protection afforded by the First 
Amendment.186  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals started its 
analysis in Trout Point Lodge by stating, “[t]here is no meaningful 
dispute that the law applied by the Nova Scotia Court provides 
less protection of speech and press than First Amendment and 
Mississippi law.”187  Under the First Amendment and Mississippi 
law, a plaintiff is required to prove that defamatory statements 
are false;188 whereas under Canadian law, the element of falsity is 
presumed and, truth is an affirmative defense for a defamation 
defendant.189  The Court of Appeals acknowledged a difference in 
policy, stating that Canada offers “considerable protection to . . . 
right to reputation,” and “American laws both seem to show a 
certain bias towards freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press.”190  In sum, the Court of Appeals’ brief and cursory analysis 
exemplifies that the application of the exception to the case was 
more of a formality.  The protection that the exception was 
intended to afford to a defamation plaintiff is completely non-
existent. 
As discussed, the Equivalency Exception requires that the 
foreign law offer free speech protection equivalent to that in the 
 
 186.  See generally International Defamation Law Database, KELLY / 
WARNER, http://www.kellywarnerlaw.com/defamation-around-the-world/ (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
 187.  Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 
2013) (emphasis added).  Therefore, the court easily acknowledged that it was 
relatively clear that the Equivalency Exception was dispositive. 
 188.  See, e.g., id. at 489; Blake v. Gannett Co., 529 So. 2d 595, 602 (Miss. 
1988) (quoting Chatham v. Gulf Publ’g Co., 502 So. 2d 647, 649 (Miss. 1987)).  
 189.  See, e.g., Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 489; Grant v. Torstar Corp., 
[2009] 3. S.C.R. 640, paras. 29, 32–33 (Can.).  
 190.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 489 (quoting Brouillet, supra note 25, 
at 52).   
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United States.191  However, speech protection and constitutional 
protections, in general, are derived from the history and traditions 
of a country.192  The laws of foreign nations will naturally differ 
from ours; the United States would be sanctimonious to expect a 
foreign country’s principles and policies to mimic our own history 
and traditions.  One commentator perfectly captured this idea 
when he stated that “[t]he idea . . . that a foreign nation’s 
substantive law is ‘repugnant’ unless it is identical to ours is itself 
a repugnant one.”193  Indeed, courts have consistently applied and 
enforced foreign law despite substantive differences in domestic 
and foreign law, commonly noting that: 
[The] assessment does not depend on whether the 
standards for evaluating a cause of action or the elements 
required to state a claim are identical under domestic and 
foreign law.  Instead, we necessarily focus on the 
fundamentals of the cause of action underlying the 
foreign judgment and defenses thereto, “not the 
differences in the bodies of law” or in the way in which 
remedies are afforded.194 
Therefore, the SPEECH Act requires a higher standard than what 
courts were previously implementing in other enforcement 
proceedings dealing with public policy issues.195 
It cannot be denied that most foreign speech protection will 
not rise to the level of United States speech protection.  This is 
because many foreign countries protect principles of reputation 
over free speech.196  By default, most foreign defamation 
judgments will not be rendered under law that is equivalent to 
that of the United States.197  Commentators suggest that it would 
 
 191.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 192.  See Rosen, supra note 14, at 107–08. 
 193.  Rendleman, supra note 22, at 487. 
 194.  Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1005 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 995 (10th Cir. 2005)).  
 195.  Cf. Klein, supra note 172, at 389 (“Does this mean that even ‘‘minor’ 
deviations’ from case law interpreting the First Amendment would make a 
foreign judgment unenforceable in the United States?”). 
 196.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 197.  See Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 3, at 276 (discussing a state 
codification of the Equivalency Exception and acknowledging that “[s]ince no 
other jurisdiction provides the same level of protection for speech as the 
United States, this limitation applies to virtually every foreign defamation 
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not be unconstitutional to enforce a foreign judgment rendered 
under law that differs significantly from United States law.198  
For instance, Professor Rosen noted that “while such a foreign 
judgment may be ‘Un-American’ insofar as it comes from a non-
American polity and reflects political values at variance with 
American constitutional law, neither the foreign judgment itself, 
nor its recognition or enforcement by an American court, could be 
unconstitutional.”199  Professor Rosen provided different examples 
of when courts have enforced foreign judgments rendered under 
laws contrary to the First Amendment: 
Courts enforce antidisclosure clauses in settlement 
agreements, even though a statute prohibiting disclosure 
of the same information would violate the First 
Amendment.  Similarly, while the Establishment Clause 
bars states from enacting intestacy laws that would 
disinherit children who married out of a particular 
religious faith, state courts regularly enforce wills that 
contain such anti-intermarriage provisions.200 
Accordingly, a United States court can enforce a foreign judgment 
without “triggering” the Constitution.201  It would not be 
unconstitutional for an American enforcing court to enforce a 
judgment rendered under law that differs from that in the United 
States.  The equivalency requirement that the SPEECH Act 
imposes is not constitutionally necessary. 
 
judgment”).  
 198.  The scope of this paper cannot possibly encompass the full thrust of 
this argument.  Nor can the argument be boiled down to a few paragraphs.  
For a more in-depth discussion on enforcing foreign judgments rendered 
under law in opposition to the United States Constitution, see generally 
Rosen, supra note 14; Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 171 (2004).  
 199.  Rosen, supra note 14, at 112.  
 200.  Id.  From a choice of law perspective, United States courts are often 
required to apply foreign law in domestic proceedings, even if the law applied 
could not have been constitutionally enacted by a state.  See id. at 113.  The 
ability to apply law that is contrary to the United States Constitution is 
permissible because the United States Constitution does not apply to foreign 
countries.  See id. 
 201.  Id. 
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2. Domestic Success Exception 
The Domestic Success Exception allows for enforcement if the 
defendant would have been liable had the suit originally been filed 
in the enforcing court.202  The exception poses an array of issues.  
At first glance, the exception appears to require that, as a 
precursor to enforcement, the foreign plaintiff would have been 
successful in the United States on the merits.203  In other words, 
the exception appears to require an inquiry into the success of the 
suit as to the plaintiff’s prima facie defamation claim.  This is 
because the exception falls under the First Amendment 
Considerations sub-section.204  If the purpose behind the sub-
section is to ensure that the foreign proceeding receives as much 
speech protection as a domestic proceeding, then one would 
assume that the appropriate analysis is to consider the merits, or 
substance, of the case.  However, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Trout Point Lodge barely analyzed the exception on the 
merits of the suit, or substantively.205  Rather, the court primarily 
analyzed the exception on the pleadings, or procedurally.206  The 
enforcing court in Trout Point Lodge considered whether the 
Canadian pleadings were sufficient to support a Mississippi 
default judgment under Mississippi pleading requirements.207  
Although pleadings entail substantive elements, the assessment of 
the validity of a default judgment more directly correlates to a 
procedural victory.  The lack of guidance and clarity into how the 
exception should generally be applied is problematic for courts and 
is likely to cause difficulty in adjudication.  Nevertheless, 
regardless of which approach courts adopt—substantive review on 
the merits or procedural review on the pleadings—neither offers 
much protection. 
As indicated, the court in Trout Point Lodge primarily 
analyzed the Domestic Success Exception on the pleadings and 
reviewed the success of the plaintiffs’ case in the United States 
without considerable attention to the merits.208  Under 
 
 202.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 203.  See id. 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  See 729 F.3d 481, 490–96 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 206.  See id. at 491–94. 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  See id. at 490–96. 
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Mississippi law, “[t]he threshold question in a defamation suit is 
whether the published statements are false. . . . [M]inor 
inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the 
gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.”209  The 
plaintiffs relied on both the Statement of Claim and Nova Scotia 
damages proceeding to support their accusations of falsity.210  The 
court primarily focused on the Statement of Claim.211 
Since the plaintiffs were successful in Canada by default, the 
Court of Appeals required the plaintiffs to prove that the pleading 
was sufficient to support a default judgment under Mississippi 
law.212  Under Mississippi law, a default judgment is enforceable, 
“but only so far as it is supported by well-pleaded allegations, 
assumed to be true.”213  The court went on to state that “blanket 
assertions” are insufficient to support a claim.214  Therefore, 
 
 209.  Id. at 490 (quoting Armistead v. Minor, 815 So. 2d 1189, 1194 (Miss. 
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 210.  Id. at 490–91.  The support the plaintiffs offered is debatably in 
error.  The Statement of Claim and Canadian damages proceeding included 
very general accusations of falsity.  For instance, the Nova Scotia court stated 
in a cursory fashion that Handshoe’s statements were “unfounded,” 
“misrepresent[ed] facts,” and “outrageous . . . in the face of true facts about 
the plaintiffs.”  Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 2012 NSSC 245, paras. 
91, 93–94 (Can.); see also Brief of Appellants, supra note 144, at 23–34.  The 
plaintiffs focused their argument on the fact that well-pleaded allegations are 
accepted as true in a default judgment proceeding.  See Brief for Appellants, 
supra note 144, at 16–17.  See also Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l 
Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).  However, the key phrase is “well-
pleaded.”  Pursuant to Mississippi law, “blanket assertions” are not well-
pleaded or sufficient to state a claim for relief.  See DynaSteel Corp. v. Aztec 
Indus., Inc., 611 So. 2d 977, 985 (Miss. 1992).  Therefore, it was arguably 
obvious that the plaintiffs’ general allegations were not going to be accepted 
as true or sufficient to support a default judgment had the same 
circumstances played out in Mississippi.  The plaintiffs’ best argument under 
the Domestic Success Exception was to present evidence of falsity as if they 
were litigating the case for the first time.  The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged this point by stating that “even [if the statements were] 
deemed admitted, the allegations likely would have been insufficient—
without subsequent evidence, analysis, and fact-finding.”  Trout Point Lodge, 
729 F.3d at 494.  The plaintiffs’ strong reliance on the Canadian suit and 
waiver of discovery might have assisted in digging their own grave.   
 211.  See Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 492–94. 
 212.  Id. at 491. 
 213.  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Leach v. Shelter Ins. Co., 909 So. 
2d 1283, 1288 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 214.  Id. (citing DynaSteel, 611 So. 2d at 985) (internal quotation marks 
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falsity must have been well-pleaded, including more than blanket 
allegations, in order for the Canadian Statement of Claim to be 
sufficient to support a Mississippi default judgment.  The Court of 
Appeals found that the Canadian Statement of Claim contained a 
few specific allegations of falsity; but overall, the Statement of 
Claim did not offer evidence to rebut Handshoe’s allegations.215  It 
was not even clear from the pleading which statements were 
generally alleged to be false.216  In addition, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals categorized many of the alleged facts as 
unverifiable opinions or legal conclusions.217  Neither unverifiable 
opinions nor legal conclusions are actionable in a defamation 
proceeding in Mississippi.218  As a result, the Court of Appeals 
held that the default judgment was not enforceable in Mississippi 
because the Canadian Statement of Claim was not sufficient 
under Mississippi’s pleading requirements.219 
It may appear that not considering the merits was an easier 
option for the Fifth Circuit, as the case had not moved through 
discovery in Canada.  The lack of detail and evidence would have 
made the case quite difficult to litigate in the abstract.  Although 
a straightforward option, it makes little sense to consider whether 
a foreign complaint survives scrutiny under United States law, 
because a complaint, or its equivalent, will be drafted in 
accordance with the requirements of the applicable jurisdiction.220  
 
omitted).  
 215.  Id. at 491–92. 
 216.  Id. at 492. 
 217.  Id. at 493–94.  For example, the court stated that it was unverifiable 
opinion whether “Trout Point had ‘Champagne taste on a beer budget,’ Perret 
and Leary were a ‘litigious bunch,’ [or] the Nova Scotia action was ‘foolish 
and frivolous.’”  Id. at 493 (quoting Pl.’s First Am. Statement Cl.).  The court 
also noted, “[g]iven the legal significance attached to the word ‘falsity,’ 
Mississippi law requires Trout Point to do more than merely cry ‘false’ to 
prove its claim.”  Id. at 494. 
 218.  Id. at 493–94.  See also DynaSteel, 611 So. 2d at 985 (“Allegations 
that are in effect conclusions of law are not considered well-pleaded 
allegations, however, and a defendant will not be held to have admitted such 
averments on default.”); Johnson v. Delta-Democrat Publ’g Co., 531 So. 2d 
811, 814 (Miss. 1988) (“[N]ame calling and verbal abuse are to be taken as 
statements of opinion, not fact, and therefore will not give rise to an action 
for libel.”).   
 219.  Trout Point Lodge, 729 F.3d at 494.  
 220.   If a court considers the exceptions in order, it can be assumed that 
the court would have already established the conflict in the laws of the two 
countries. 
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The plaintiffs in Trout Point Lodge would have likely drafted a 
completely different complaint had the suit been filed in the 
United States.  Does it really make any sense to compare a 
pleading prepared under one law’s requirements to what a 
pleading should be under a different law?  Isn’t it obvious that a 
pleading under law X may not necessarily be sufficient under the 
law of Y? 
If the interpretation of the second exception requires scrutiny 
of foreign pleadings, this exception can also appear to offer no 
protection to defamation plaintiffs.  Pleadings sufficient under 
more lenient law will almost never be sufficient under different, 
and more stringent, law unless the plaintiff has pled more than 
necessary.  What plaintiff would plead unnecessary allegations?  
Although Congress offered little guidance on the appropriate 
application of the second exception, the pleading interpretation is 
not consistent with the intent of the legislature.221  The SPEECH 
Act was enacted to protect the First Amendment, and the 
exception is listed as a First Amendment Consideration.222  
Moreover, the entire purpose of the Act is to compare foreign 
policy to that of the United States and only enforce judgments 
that are in harmony with United States principles of free 
speech.223  Accordingly, it is likely that Congress did not intend 
for the exception to apply in the way the court in Trout Point 
Lodge discerned it; rather, it appears that Congress intended this 
exception to apply when a defamation suit in an American 
enforcing court would result in the same outcome on the merits as 
a foreign court. 
Substantive application of the Domestic Success Exception 
appears to be in accord with the legislative intent.  However, the 
interpretation leaves courts in even more of a debacle.  How does 
one litigate a claim in the abstract?  Evidentiary and procedural 
rules vary from country to country; therefore, a plaintiff would 
likely have had different advantages and disadvantages litigating 
under American laws. Should these considerations be taken into 
account when assessing whether the plaintiff would have been 
successful had the suit been filed in the enforcing court? For 
 
 221.  See S. REP. NO. 111-124 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-154 (2009).  
 222.  See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(B) (2012).  
 223.  See id. § 4102(a).  Albeit, there are likely none in accordance. 
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instance, American courts routinely have broader discovery than 
foreign courts.224  It is unclear if the enforcing court should allow 
a discovery phase in accordance with American principles in order 
to determine the success of the plaintiff’s claim on domestic soil; or 
if the enforcing court should limit discovery to the foreign court’s 
rules; or if the enforcing court should just accept the foreign 
court’s finding of facts.225  Another problem arises in cases similar 
to Trout Point Lodge, where discovery has not yet taken place.  
Should the court accept the facts as pled or allow discovery to 
occur? 
Furthermore, the statute may possibly imply a higher 
standard of proof than a domestic defamation proceeding.  The 
statute states that the exception applies if the enforcing court 
finds that the defendant “would have been found liable” in a 
domestic proceeding.226  The ambiguity surrounding the words 
“would have been” can result in two differing interpretations.  One 
interpretation of this language is that the enforcing court must 
find the defendant liable with near certainty.  In other words, the 
enforcing court must be more certain on liability than required by 
a preponderance of the evidence standard (which could easily shift 
either way), even though proof by preponderance in a domestic 
proceeding would still render a defendant liable.  Another 
interpretation is that the enforcing court must find the defendant 
liable using the domestic standard of proof.  These various 
questions are just some on a long-list left unresolved by 
Congress.227 
 
 224.  See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District 
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987) (“It is well known that the scope of American 
discovery is often significantly broader than is permitted in other 
jurisdictions.”); Heraeus Kulzer v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 
2011) (“Discovery in the federal court system is far broader than in most 
(maybe all) foreign countries.”).   
 225.  In addition to the lack of guidance given by the legislature, the 
second exception is a waste of judicial resources.  In essence, the court is 
litigating a claim that another court has already spent time and money 
litigating.  See Robinson, supra note 11, at 923 (“It costs the nations far more 
to retry cases that have already been tried in other jurisdictions than to 
enforce a foreign judgment.”). 
 226.  28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 227.  Many are left unanswered because enforcing courts rarely engage in 
any analysis of the merits.  Aside from the narrow exceptions to enforcement, 
judgments are often enforced even if the enforcing court finds that the 
judgment court acted in error in some way.  This lack of inquiry is due to 
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In Trout Point Lodge, the Court of Appeals did briefly analyze 
the Canadian damages proceeding in an attempt to review the 
merits of the suit.228  However, not only did the court find that the 
Nova Scotia court’s findings were “insufficient to demonstrate 
falsity,” it also noted that “the plain language of the SPEECH Act 
suggests that the purported ‘factual findings’ of the Nova Scotia 
Court are irrelevant to the enforceability inquiry.”229  The court 
continued by stating that “[t]he critical question is not whether 
the Nova Scotia Court found falsity, but rather whether a state or 
federal court in Mississippi faced with the allegations . . . would 
have done so.”230  It is clear from the statutory language that the 
enforcing court needs to “re-litigate” the substance of the case; 
however, it is not clear that the foreign court’s factual findings are 
wholly irrelevant to the analysis.231  If a foreign court happened to 
engage in more analysis than required by its own law—say, 
scrutinizing whether statements were false—why should those 
findings be wholly irrelevant to the enforcing court?  In addition, 
the Court of Appeals stated that the Nova Scotia court supported 
the damage award with allegations and evidence that the 
Mississippi court would not have credited, such as allegations not 
initially pled in the Statement of Claim.232 
Would Trout Point Lodge have been decided differently if the 
Court of Appeals interpreted the second exception to require a 
substantive analysis of whether the claim would have been 
successful in Mississippi?  Without discovery from either the 
Canadian or American court, the question is difficult to answer.  
As discussed, the Canadian Statement of Claim did not contain 
 
principles of res judicata.  Therefore, the Domestic Success Exception’s 
“relitigation” is not in accord with res judicata preclusion principles.  The Act, 
essentially, offends res judicata principles in order to determine if it should 
apply a res judicata effect. 
 228.  See Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 494–96 (5th 
Cir. 2013).   
 229.  Id. at 494–95. 
 230.  Id. at 494. 
 231.  Let alone plainly. 
 232.  Id. at 495–96.  It appears that the court is again returning to a 
procedural analysis, as opposed to the unguided substantive approach.  The 
court also returned to the procedural analysis when it stated that “the Nova 
Scotia Court issued its factual findings at a damages hearing that occurred 
after it had already granted default judgment in favor of Trout Point.”  Id. at 
495. 
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allegations of falsity as required by Mississippi law; however, the 
failure to sufficiently plead falsity does not mean that the plaintiff 
could not have gathered information to prove the insufficient 
allegations.233  For example, the plaintiffs could have produced 
evidence to demonstrate that they did comply with Canadian 
authorities in order to rebut Handshoe’s allegations that the pair 
attempted to mislead investigations.  Although rare cases could 
produce the same result under different laws, the lack of guidance 
as to the application of the second exception renders the protection 
feeble. 
The lack of protection afforded by the exceptions and lack of 
guidance given by the legislature add to the Act’s over-inclusive 
nature.234  The SPEECH Act does not differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate forums, nor provide any protection to 
foreign defamation plaintiffs.  Due to the strict application of the 
exceptions, only a small percentage of foreign defamation 
judgments will be enforceable in the United States.  Therefore, the 
vast majority of foreign defamation judgments will be 
unenforceable in the United States regardless of whether they fall 
into the category of libel tourism.235 
D. Additional Ambiguity in Applying Domestic Free Speech 
Protection 
The SPEECH Act fails to explicitly account for the variations 
in defamation law across the United States, namely the 
differences between private and public defamation.  A purely 
private defamation suit occurs when a private plaintiff is defamed 
 
 233.  See supra note 210.  
 234.  The SPEECH Act can also be viewed as under-inclusive.  It aims to 
deter libel tourism and reduce the chilling effect on the First Amendment; 
however, it does not prohibit a foreign suit from commencing.  Libel tourists 
may be able to enforce the defamation judgment abroad or force the 
defendant into a settlement position.  Aside from a monetary award, libel 
tourists may bring suits to gain a moral victory or prosecute under criminal 
laws.  The under-inclusive nature of the SPEECH Act has been addressed at 
length.  For more in-depth discussion on the perspective, see generally 
Elizabeth J. Elias, Note, Nearly Toothless: Why The Speech Act is Mostly 
Bark, With Little Bite, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 235 (2011).  
 235.  See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 176, at 19 
(summarizing the strict interpretation of the SPEECH Act and concluding, 
“there can never be a Canadian defamation judgment executed in the United 
States against an American citizen”). 
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on a matter of private concern—to illustrate, a colleague falsely 
stating to another colleague that their employer is often 
intoxicated during work hours.  A purely public defamation suit 
occurs when a public plaintiff is defamed on a matter of public 
concern—for example, FOX News falsely reporting that a 
government official embezzled government funds.  A hybrid 
defamation suit can be either: (a) private plaintiff/public concern—
local newspaper falsely reporting that a psychologically ill 
individual placed a bomb in a local mall, or (b) public 
plaintiff/private concern—a family member of Sandra Bullock 
falsely telling her friend that Bullock was deported to Canada.236  
Most defamation suits involve some public context, as purely 
private defamation is usually contained and may not result in a 
compensable diminished reputation.  Different elements and 
degrees of fault apply depending on the categorization of the 
defamation suit. 
The protection afforded to defamation defendants by the First 
Amendment is highly associated with publicity and the fear of 
defamation chilling speech on matters of important public 
concern.237  As a result, defamation suits with private components 
often have less stringent standards.238  Although the United 
States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue, a 
variety of lower courts have held that the states retain the right to 
apply traditional common law principles of defamation to purely 
private suits.  For example, the United States District Court for 
 
 236.  In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14–20 (1990), the 
Court recognized a distinction between media defendants and non-media 
defendants, acknowledging that the First Amendment gives heightened 
protection to the press.  It is unclear exactly what role this distinction plays 
in the defamation categorization analysis.  
 237.  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“The First 
Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ ‘[S]peech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.’ Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on 
public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First 
Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))). 
 238.  See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 759–61 (1985). 
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that “the [United 
States Supreme] Court has never ruled that the Constitution 
requires any change in the ‘features of the common law landscape’ 
as they relate to . . . a defamation action brought by a private 
plaintiff based on language relating to an issue of private 
concern.”239  New York currently applies common law defamation 
elements to purely private defamation cases.240  In 2002, the 
Supreme Court of New York stated in Zaidi v. United Bank Ltd. 
that “it appears that where there is a private plaintiff, private 
concern(s) and a non-media defendant . . . no degree of fault, i.e. 
strict liability, applies.”241  The states also retain the right to 
impose the degree of fault required in a private plaintiff/public 
concern defamation suit—negligence, gross negligence, 
recklessness, malice, or intent.242 
Traditional common law defamation closely mirrors the 
current defamation elements in both the United Kingdom and 
Canada.  In short, the approach is a modified form of strict 
liability.  No degree of fault or falsity is required; rather once a 
statement is held defamatory, the statement is presumed false, 
and truth is an affirmative defense.243  Many states do impose a 
degree of fault or a requirement of falsity in purely private 
defamation suits; however, this can be interpreted as a sovereign 
decision and not a constitutional requirement.  Consequently, 
there are a variety of different approaches in the United States to 
private defamation.  These differences in private defamation law 
depend on a particular jurisdiction’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment. 
By definition, the SPEECH Act applies to all causes of action 
where speech has allegedly caused reputational damage.244  The 
 
 239.  Roffman v. Trump, 754 F. Supp. 411, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting 
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986)).  The court 
additionally stated that “the actionability of statements of opinion in the 
private plaintiff/private issue context must be determined by reference to 
state law.”  Id. 
 240.  See, e.g., Zaidi v. United Bank Ltd., 747 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272–73, 279 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). 
 241.  Id. at 279. 
 242.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
 243.  See, e.g., Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579, 581–
82 (5th Cir. 1967) (discussing libel per se); Kilian v. Doubleday & Co., 79 A.2d 
657, 659–60 (Pa. 1951) (discussing truth as an affirmative defense).  
 244.  28 U.S.C. § 4101(1) (2012). 
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language of the exceptions do not explicitly direct an enforcing 
court to apply speech protection in accordance with the enforcing 
forum’s interpretation of the First Amendment.245  As stated 
above, common law defamation closely mirrors current defamation 
law in the United Kingdom and Canada.  There are clearly not 
policy issues with enforcing equivalent law.  However, an issue 
can arise if the enforcing court does not apply the equivalent law, 
but rather some heightened version. 
The United States House of Representatives recognized the 
possible broad application by noting: 
The Supreme Court has reserved decision on whether the 
plaintiff must prove falsity if the [sic] he or she is a 
private (rather than a public) figure and the statement 
concerns a private matter.  That narrow category of cases 
is not likely to be implicated by [the SPEECH Act]; but if 
it ever were to be, the courts would be able to address the 
question.246 
Yet, the SPEECH Act does not explicitly guide courts in 
addressing this question.247  This omission could result in foreign, 
private defamation defendants being afforded more constitutional 
protection than domestic private defamation defendants.  For 
instance, a New York court (which would apply strict liability to a 
purely private defamation case) may use the standards imposed 
by New York Times (malice and falsity) when applying the 
SPEECH Act.  Given the glorification of the First Amendment in 
the SPEECH Act, the New York court could easily interpret the 
Act to require application of the most stringent First Amendment 
protections. Even if the language is more comprehensive than 
anticipated, the lack of precise language will ultimately result in 
some incorrect interpretation.  Without clear statutory language, 
defamation defendants could incorrectly receive free speech 
protection that the First Amendment does not necessarily require. 
 
 245.  See id. § 4102(a). 
 246.  H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 2 n.3 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 247.  It is not clear that the legislature even intended for the SPEECH Act 
to apply to purely private defamation cases.  The failure to include a carve-
out for those cases only magnifies the need to apply First Amendment 
jurisprudence in accordance with the enforcing forum’s precedent.  
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E. High Risk of Offending International Comity 
United States courts are not required to enforce foreign 
judgments; the recognition and enforcement of such judgments is 
largely dealt with by the individual states.248  Still, despite 
lacking an international form of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
the United States largely enforces foreign judgments in order to 
gain reciprocity and demonstrate respect for the opinions of other 
courts.249  The over-inclusive nature of the SPEECH Act risks 
offending international comity.250  Such a risk could possibly 
result in non-enforcement of United States judgments in foreign 
courts or some other form of legal retaliation.251 
Canadian courts have already exhibited signs of frustration in 
Trout Point Lodge’s most recent litigation.252  After the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision, the plaintiffs filed a request for 
reassessment of damages in Nova Scotia and also asserted a 
separate cause of action for copyright infringement.253  The 
copyright infringement allegations centered on photos that were 
posted on Handshoe’s blog, namely of the plaintiffs and the 
Lodge.254  The court acknowledged that the defendant’s blog was 
 
 248.  See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).  
 249.  See id. at 163–64 (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of 
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon 
the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having 
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”). 
 250.  See, e.g., Klein, supra note 172, at 387–91 (outlining the various 
comity concerns that the SPEECH Act imposes and suggesting revisions); 
Robinson, supra note 11, at 925 (“It may be useful for American lawmakers to 
take a ‘Golden Rule’ approach or, at least, to look into a metaphorical policy 
mirror.  Under the current law, the United States refuses to enforce foreign 
libel judgments because of a fundamental belief in the importance of absolute 
free speech.  What if other countries similarly refused to legally cooperate 
with the United States based on a fundamental societal belief?”).  But see 
Gerny, supra note 3, at 441–43 (arguing that the SPEECH Act does not 
offend international comity and is possibly unnecessary because of reform in 
defamation law in the United Kingdom, recent proposals for an international 
judgment enforcement treaty, and the public policy exception).  
 251.  Cf. Robinson, supra note 11, at 928 (“If other nations acted similarly 
based on their own idiosyncratic values, the world and the United States 
would suffer from a global lack of cooperation.”).  
 252.  See Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 2014 NSSC 62 (Can.). 
 253.  Id. at para. 1. 
 254.  Id. at para. 17. 
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used as a “commercial enterprise” and that Handshoe posted the 
photos to “destroy the business interests of Trout Point Lodge, 
Charles Leary and Vaughn Perret.”255  Despite the new cause of 
action, more than half of the Canadian court’s opinion is dedicated 
to the previous defamation suit.256  The court noted that the 
defendant failed to abide by the injunction and continued to 
defame the plaintiffs.257  The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
awarded the plaintiffs $425,000 in damages.258  The court stated 
that “it is abundantly clear that Mr. Handshoe feels entirely 
immune from the orders of this Court.  In fact it is not an 
overstatement to say that Mr. Handshoe ‘snubs his nose’ at all 
judicial officers and institutions of Nova Scotia.”259  These bold 
statements clearly exemplify the frustration of the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court.  Just as Trout Point Lodge was the first case to 
illustrate the major issues associated with the SPEECH Act, 
Canada is the first country to react to the international disrespect 
the Act is generating. 
The spin-off litigation of Trout Point Lodge is likely in 
retaliation of the Fifth Circuit’s holding.  It is plausible that the 
Canadian court acted out of sympathy and wanted to ensure that 
the plaintiffs were sufficiently compensated for Handshoe’s 
“ongoing campaign to damage, harass and embarrass [them].”260  
One blogger noted that “[t]his time, Leary and Perret did an end-
run around the constitutional loophole by claiming copyright 
infringement.”261  The author noted that “[u]nlike the previous 
 
 255.  Id. at para. 18. 
 256.  Id. at paras. 1–16.  The discussion surrounding the proof of falsity 
does not appear to be escalated from the original proceeding in an effort to 
secure enforcement of the additional defamation damages in the United 
States.  See id.  It is apparent that neither the Canadian court nor the 
plaintiffs are willing to succumb to the broad application of the SPEECH Act. 
 257.  Id. at para. 9. 
 258.  Id. at paras. 13–16, 27–28.  The breakdown of the damages is as 
follows: $135,000 in additional defamation damages, $60,000 in aggravated 
damages, $50,000 in punitive defamation damages, $80,000 in copyright 
infringement damages, and $100,000 in punitive copyright infringement 
damages.  Id. 
 259.  Id. at para. 9.  
 260.  Id. at para. 25.  
 261.  Steve Mertl, N.S. fishing lodge owners targeted online win another 
suit against Mississippi blogger, YAHOO! SPORTS CAN. (Feb. 24, 2014, 9:37 
PM), https://ca.sports.yahoo.com/blogs/dailybrew/n-fishing-lodge-owners-
targeted-online-win-another-023750915.html.  
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case, the copyright infringement should not run afoul of the free-
speech protection Handshoe hid behind in the defamation 
case.”262  The plaintiffs are currently seeking to enforce the 
copyright damages in Mississippi state court.263 
V. CUTTING BACK THE BROAD APPLICATION OF THE SPEECH ACT 
The policies behind the SPEECH Act are very clear: deter 
libel tourism and protect the First Amendment.264  However, the 
Act’s broad scope and lack of guidance affects defamation suits 
that have a legitimate nexus with a foreign forum.  First, the Act 
fails to differentiate between judgments emanating from 
legitimate versus illegitimate forums at the outset.  Second, the 
exceptions offer little protection to foreign defamation plaintiffs 
because they are largely illusory and lack necessary guidance.  
Finally, the Act fails to explicitly direct enforcing courts to apply 
speech protection in accordance with the forum’s First 
Amendment interpretation.  As a result, the over-inclusive nature 
of the Act risks offending principles of international comity.  With 
that said, the Act provides significant benefits to defamation 
defendants involved in libel tourism and a complete elimination of 
the Act would discard valuable protection for them.265  The 
predictability of enforcement can be very beneficial in the 
appropriate circumstances.  Accordingly, I propose two revisions: 
(1) a forum non conveniens threshold to the Act’s applicability and 
(2) a statutory addition of an “Application” clause to the First 
Amendment Considerations sub-section.266  The addition of a 
 
 262.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 263.  See Petition to Enroll Foreign Judgment, Perret v. Handshoe, No. 
14-0197 (June 2, 2014); see also Perret v. Handshoe, No. 1:14CV241-LG-JCG 
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 24, 2014) (PACER, Miss. Case law) (remanding case to state 
court).  Handshoe told the Toronto Star that the recent decision was 
“worthless” and vowed to continue to urge tourists to stay clear of Trout Point 
Lodge.  Peter Edwards, Nova Scotia couple wins copyright lawsuit against 
homophobic U.S. blogger, TORONTO STAR (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.thestar. 
com/news/canada/2014/02/24/nova_scotia_couple_wins_lawsuit_against_homo
phobic_american_blogger.html.  
 264.  See S. REP. NO. 111-224 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-154 (2009).  
 265.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4102–4105 (2012).  See also Gerny, supra note 3, at 
437–40.  
 266.  The proposals are suggested legislative amendments.  
Unfortunately, the enforcing courts have little “wiggle room” to manipulate 
the SPEECH Act.  
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threshold requirement would provide courts with the ability to 
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate forums in the 
enforcement of foreign defamation judgments.  The Application 
clause would provide enforcing courts with more guidance, 
thereby ensuring that domestic and foreign defamation 
defendants are treated equally.  With these revisions, the 
interests of both plaintiffs and defendants would be adequately 
balanced.267 
A. Forum Non Conveniens Threshold 
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine utilized by defendants to 
seek dismissal of a case based on the fact that there is a more 
convenient forum elsewhere.268  The litigation tactic is used at the 
front-end of litigation (pleading stage);269 however, the use of a 
“reverse” forum non conveniens analysis at the back-end of 
litigation (enforcement stage) can help ensure that foreign 
defamation judgments emanating from legitimate forums are 
enforced.270  The application of the threshold is straightforward.  
 
 267.  As discussed in grave detail, the SPEECH Act could benefit from 
substantial overhauling.  The mere addition of the suggested Application 
clause does not even begin to address the current statutory issues.  A more 
complete statutory revision is outside the scope of this Comment.  The focus 
of this Comment is to address the lack of differentiation between foreign 
defamation judgments rendered by legitimately and illegitimately selected 
forums.  The fact that the SPEECH Act provides little protection to foreign 
defamation plaintiffs only magnifies the problems associated with this lack of 
distinction.  I believe that a forum non conveniens threshold would largely 
solve this problem.  Any judgment still subject to the SPEECH Act after 
application of the threshold would likely be a product of libel tourism.  At 
that point, the mess that the Act creates would be less of an issue.  
 268.  See 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3828 (4th ed. 2013). 
 269.  Although a forum non conveniens motion can be brought at any 
point during the litigation,  
it behooves the defendant to raise the forum non conveniens defense 
within a reasonable time of becoming aware of the 
circumstances[,] . . . [because i]f the litigation has progressed 
significantly . . . a defendant’s belated assertion that the forum is not 
a convenient one is likely to be viewed dimly by the district judge.   
Id. § 3828, at 580. 
 270.  A form of reverse forum non conveniens has already been used in the 
enforcement context alongside other discretionary forms of non-recognition, 
such as the public policy exception.  For example, many states allow a court 
to resist enforcement of a foreign judgment if the foreign country’s only basis 
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The enforcing court would conduct an inquiry into the 
hypothetical success of a forum non conveniens motion in the 
foreign court using federal forum non conveniens law.271  If the 
enforcing court finds that the original proceeding should have 
been dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, the SPEECH 
Act would apply to the enforcement proceeding.  However, if the 
enforcing court finds that the original proceeding should not have 
been dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens, the SPEECH 
Act would not apply, and the enforcement proceeding would be 
assessed in accordance with the applicable judgment enforcement 
law in the enforcing forum.272 
Essentially, the forum non conveniens analysis is a surrogate 
for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forums; the 
 
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was personal service and the 
forum was inconvenient.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1716(C)(6) (West 
Supp. 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(2)(f) (West Supp. 2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
5304(b)(7) (McKinney Supp. 2014).  Cf. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 
416, paras. 185–86 (Can.) (LeBel, J., dissenting) (“There is an important 
difference between the inquiry conducted by a court assuming jurisdiction at 
the outset of the action and the test applied by a court asked to recognize and 
enforce a judgment at the end.  In the former case, two steps are involved: the 
court must first determine that it has a basis for jurisdiction, and if it does it 
must go on to decide whether it should nevertheless decline to exercise that 
jurisdiction because another forum is clearly more appropriate for the 
hearing of the action.  In the latter case of a receiving court, only the first 
step in this inquiry is relevant.  Provided that the originating court had a 
reasonable basis for jurisdiction, the defendant had its chance to appear 
there and argue forum non conveniens, and cannot question the originating 
court’s decision on that issue in the receiving court.  Nevertheless, the 
receiving court is not bound to agree with the originating court’s opinion that 
it had a reasonable basis on which to assume jurisdiction.  If the connections 
to the originating forum are tenuous or greatly outweighed by the hardship 
imposed on the defendant forced to litigate there, the receiving court may 
conclude that it was not even a reasonable place for the action to be heard.  It 
is no good to say that the defendant should have raised the question of 
hardship by arguing forum non conveniens before the foreign court.  If it is 
unfair to expect the defendant to litigate on the merits in the foreign 
jurisdiction, it is probably unfair to expect the defendant to appear there to 
argue forum non conveniens.”). 
 271.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
 272.  As discussed above, the doctrine of forum non conveniens may not 
always be available to a defamation defendant who was victimized by libel 
tourism.  See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.  The forum non 
conveniens threshold essentially steps in and does the job of the foreign 
court—inquiring into whether there was another available, adequate, and 
more convenient forum for the litigation.  
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goal is to have the SPEECH Act apply only to those judgments 
that originate from illegitimate forums.  The threshold informs 
the parties, as a preliminary matter, whether the judgment is 
emanating from a legitimate forum (one that a United States 
court would regard as appropriate as gauged by United States 
forum non conveniens law) or an illegitimate forum (one that a 
United States court would regard as inappropriate as gauged by 
United States forum non conveniens law).  In the latter scenario, 
the plaintiff is arguably a “libel tourist”—someone who is trying to 
take advantage of favorable foreign law without a significant basis 
for doing so.  Therefore, the inquiry will provide courts with a tool 
to better effectuate the policy behind the Act.  The inquiry will 
ensure that the Act only applies to the intended “tourists”—
thereby eliminating the risk the current Act poses on 
international comity. 
Aside from using the threshold at the outset of the 
enforcement analysis, the inquiry should also be available as a 
declaratory judgment by either party at the front-end of litigation 
as well.273  A declaratory judgment as to the Act’s applicability at 
the outset of litigation would provide substantial predictability for 
both parties.  For example, a defamation plaintiff could predict 
whether a foreign defamation judgment would be enforceable in 
the United States prior to adjudicating in a foreign country.  In 
other words, if a defamation plaintiff obtains a declaratory 
judgment that the SPEECH Act does not apply, he can rest 
assured that he will not have to jump through hoops of fire to 
enforce a judgment in the United States.  On the other hand, the 
inquiry could assist defamation defendants in the decision to 
defend the foreign suit, on account of the fact that the declaratory 
judgment will indicate that the plaintiff will have to jump through 
hoops of fire. 
Regardless of whether the threshold is used at the front-end 
or back-end of litigation, the analysis would save judicial 
resources.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens is usually 
 
 273.  This would be in addition to the declaratory judgment available to a 
defamation defendant after a judgment has been rendered by the foreign 
court.  28 U.S.C. § 4104 (2012).  Since the forum non conveniens analysis 
would be the “front door” to the SPEECH Act, a successful declaratory 
judgment at this stage would state:  (1) the SPEECH Act applies, and (2) the 
SPEECH Act halts enforcement of the foreign defamation judgment. 
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applied at the very early stages of a proceeding; therefore, the 
analysis requires minimal discovery and is not usually 
burdensome.274  Although the Equivalency Exception may be 
fairly effortless for a court to assess, it still requires interpretation 
of foreign law.275  Likewise, the Domestic Success Exception 
requires substantial consideration into the success of the defamed 
plaintiff’s claim.276  A forum non conveniens threshold would 
require fewer judicial resources and save additional expenditures 
for the cases that the SPEECH Act intends to deter.  In sum, a 
forum non conveniens threshold to the applicability of the 
SPEECH Act would afford protection to judgments rendered from 
legitimate forums, effectuate the policy behind the Act, remove 
risks posed to international comity, provide substantial benefits to 
both parties, and save judicial resources. 
B. Additional Application Clause 
The statutory language of the SPEECH Act fails to explicitly 
direct courts to apply different levels of First Amendment 
protection in accordance with their state precedent.277  Both 
exceptions merely state that a court should apply: (1) First 
Amendment law, and (2) state constitutional law.278  The Act does 
not explicitly direct courts to apply these protections based on the 
private/public distinction.  Without an explicit Application clause, 
some courts are bound to get it wrong and end up applying more 
speech protection than the First Amendment requires. I propose 
the following draft as an additional “Application” clause to the 
First Amendment Considerations sub-section: 
Application. 
A domestic court should construe the 
protection for freedom of speech and press in 
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and the constitution and law of 
 
 274.  See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258 (stating that extensive evidence 
for a forum non conveniens motion “is not necessary” and would “defeat the 
purpose of [the] motion”).  
 275.  See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A).  
 276.  See id. § 4102(a)(1)(B). 
 277.  See id. §§ 4101–4102.  
 278.  Id. § 4102(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
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the State in which the domestic court is located 
based on the facts of the particular case.  An 
enforcing court should apply only the 
appropriate level of protection that is afforded 
by authoritative First Amendment precedent in 
the forum for the given circumstances.279 
The SPEECH Act already casts a wide net of American speech 
protection.  An Application clause would ensure that cases receive 
the appropriate level of speech protection.  Moreover, the proposed 
clause would ensure that domestic and foreign defamation 
defendants are treated equally. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While laudable in purpose, the SPEECH Act overshot the 
mark.  In a quest to deter libel tourism, the Act fails to 
differentiate between legitimate forum selection and illegitimate 
forum shopping.  The overbreadth of the statute is not remedied 
by the statutory exceptions as they provide little protection to 
foreign defamation plaintiffs.  In reality, the statutory language 
amplifies the broad nature of the Act by failing to explicitly state 
that speech protection should be applied in accordance with the 
precedent of the enforcing court.  As a result, the SPEECH Act 
risks offending principles of international comity.  The addition of 
a forum non conveniens threshold to the Act’s applicability would 
assist in effectuating the policy behind the Act.  The threshold 
would ensure that the Act only applies to illegitimately selected 
forums—that is, forums selected through libel tourism.  For those 
cases where the SPEECH Act does apply, the additional statutory 
revision would provide some guidance to enforcing courts and 
ensure that foreign and domestic defamation defendants are, at 
least, treated equally.  The need to deter libel tourism is high; 
however, the need to protect foreign defamation judgments 
 
 279.  I acknowledge that the suggested interpretation would make 
enforceability of foreign defamation judgments dependent upon which state 
the enforcement proceeding is filed in. Nevertheless, it is better to afford 
foreign defamation defendants an equivalent level of protection, rather than 
additional protection.  But see Klein, supra note 172, at 389–90 (arguing that 
the SPEECH Act should apply the First Amendment in accordance with 
general United States speech protection and not tie itself to state specific 
details).  
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rendered by legitimately selected forums is higher. 
 
